Biden and the doctrine of smart power

Although he has not expressed it as clearly as others in his party, President Joe Biden and others in his administration are followers of the so-called doctrine of smart power when conducting United States foreign policy.

The doctrine of smart power assumes a creative and balanced approach in the use of U.S. power. In other words, military force, economic influence and diplomacy are all blended when dealing with other countries. Although this is not new — it became a doctrine of the Obama administration — it is a counterbalance to the unbridled militarism of the Republicans and the excesses of the war on terrorism.

Smart power requires a real capacity to apply it in all its variants, as well as its adaptation to the conditions imposed by a given situation. According to this doctrine, military force must be conceived as a last resort and, to fulfill its objectives, it must be the bearer of a global proposal that interests other countries. Donald Trump’s chauvinism was the antithesis of the doctrine of smart power.

Based on this logic, it is worth analyzing whether the first steps taken by the Biden administration when it comes to foreign policy correspond to the doctrine that is expected to guide its strategy, as well as the objective limitations that its application requires.

Despite its enormous military might, the United States does not appear to be in a position to embark on major wars, such as those in Afghanistan and Iraq. However, in a need to demonstrate this power as a resource for domination, it exhibits its most dangerous foreign policy ingredient. It is also a necessary ingredient of its domestic economy, which explains the maintenance of huge military budgets. Dependence on the threat of, or use of, force constitutes an objective limitation for the most creative application of the doctrine of smart power, no matter what administration is in power.

The largest market in the world is concentrated in the United States and the country controls a good part of the international financial system. Here lie two great strengths of American foreign policy. However, these strengths have been affected by an economy in decline, which is demonstrated by the decrease of competitiveness with many of the country’s businesses. Even in the high-tech sector, where the United States retains its primacy, they are being besieged by China and other competitors. The way in which it has faced these challenges has been through the excessive application of sanctions, measures that complicate foreign policy in other respects and narrow the application frameworks of the doctrine of smart power.

Under conditions imposed by military threat and the abuse of sanctions, diplomacy, understood as the art of negotiation and conviction, has very little space to operate which constitutes the main limitation in the exercise of the doctrine of smart power. Add to this the deterioration of the image of the United States as depository par excellence of values such as democracy and respect for human rights, which have been myths on which the supposed virtues of the system have historically been based.

Until now the Biden administration has not managed to overcome the limitations that this reality imposes on the application of the doctrine of smart power — a reason for the stagnation of its external projection, giving continuity to the Trump guidelines in aspects central to its relations with the rest of the world.

Relations with China, a basic issue to bring some stability to the world economy, continues to be perceived in a confrontational framework that, more than strength, reveals the weakness of the United States to compete economically with the Asian giant. Although their reincorporation into the Paris Agreement on Climate Change saved a stumbling block in relations with Europe, other initiatives have been absent and a policy of pressure is maintained to limit the relations of these countries with China and Russia. Regarding Russia, to which Trump offered respectful treatment despite pressure from Congress and other political sectors, Biden has increased hostility and closed, even more, the few spaces for negotiation between the two countries.

Latin America and the Caribbean have been practically absent from the foreign policy docket of the new administration. Only on the issue of migration, which impacts domestic politics, and which involves Mexico and some Central American countries, is there a high degree of prioritization by the administration. With Venezuela, Biden’s policy has been similar to that of Trump’s. It is clear that powerful economic interests impose this policy of harassment, but Biden’s lack of initiative to consider a different path reflects the limited creativity of his government. In the case of Cuba, one of the few Latin American issues that have received any attention due to pressure from public opinion, it is under review and without modifications so far.

Africa has disappeared from the new administration’s map. However, in addition to everything that surrounds the Chinese problem, Asia is presented as a minefield and confusion prevails in the government’s foreign policy: there are doubts on whether to withdraw troops from Afghanistan; while the administration accuses the Saudi crown prince of murder, they would rather not sanction him; and to top this off, the U.S. fires rockets into Syrian territory in response to an alleged Iranian attack against Iraqi bases. The case of Iran is particularly inconsistent, since in practice it assumes the much criticized Trump policy that demands a renegotiation of the nuclear agreement with that country.

In the face of the pandemic, where the United States could hope to assume a global leadership role, “America First” has prevailed over other considerations. Only the re-entry into the World Health Organization can be considered a positive, rectifying one of the most dire decisions made by Trump when it comes to U.S. prestige. 

It is true that barely two months have passed since Joe Bien took office and that the domestic problems he has had to face are enormous, but the problem is that there appears to be no interest in formulating ideas to overcome this stagnation and project a different foreign policy moving forward.

Biden has not expressed any positive proposal towards the rest of the world and has not projected — like Obama did at the beginning of his term despite the tremendous economic crisis the country was facing — a certain governing philosophy. By contrast, Joe Biden’s foreign policy has, until now, been devoid of ideas.

Even more serious, the team in charge of this policy, despite being made up of people with undeniable experience, seems to have not found the right balance to guide them between their aspirations and the country’s situation. From positions of strength, packaged in an ideological purity that no one recognizes of them, and with an arrogance that recalls the worst moments of U.S. behavior in foreign policy, current government officials, including the president himself, have closed the dialogue with other actors. This is where the exercise of smart power gets stuck.

Precisely, the manifest inability to manage diplomacy constitutes one of the main disappointments with the current administration. Faced with these shortcomings, not even after replacing one of the most hated presidents in history has the new administration managed to stimulate the world’s enthusiasm for the new U.S. government. “America is back,” Secretary of State Antony Blinken declared with much fanfare. The problem is that no one knows for what.

While some may consider it too much to expect, it appears that Democrats have no choice but to overcome the culture of “manifest destiny” and look more modestly at the rest of the world. There is hope that they can. Ultimately, they are supposed to be ‘smarter’ than Republican fundamentalists.