A bad year for new Cuban migrants in the U.S.

HAVANA – Due to Trump administration policy, Cuban migrants — once treated among the most privileged in the history of the United States — in 2019 saw their condition recede to become one of the most disadvantaged groups. 

In contradiction with a practice that had survived since the signature of the immigration agreement of 1994, the Trump administration failed to comply with the 20,000 annual visas established then. This resulted in about two-thirds of the applicants seeking to emigrate being left stranded pending the corresponding permission from the U.S.

Undocumented immigrants, who were previously favored by a practice that allowed them to enter almost indiscriminately into the U.S., were also restricted after the elimination, in January 2017, of what became known as the wet foot / dry foot policy.

It was the only Obama administration measure, regarding Cuban emigration, adopted without reservation and applied with increasing rigor by the Trump administration. According to data collected by Miami immigration attorney Ira J. Kurzban, 412 Cuban undocumented immigrants were deported in 2018; in 2019 the figure reached 2,662 people. Last September, 5,864 Cubans were held in Mexico, about 40 percent who had shown up at border crossings. This number was the fourth largest of migrants held — after Hondurans, Guatemalans and Salvadorans.

Although official statements allegedly exempt them from restrictive measures applied to the rest of the immigrants and that the Cuban Adjustment act still guarantees them advantages accelerating their access to residency and citizenship in the United States, it is clear that the Trump administration has done everything possible to complicate and slow down these processes to the detriment of new Cuban immigrants seeking legalization in the U.S.

As for temporary visits by Cubans to the United States, the granting of multiple visas for five years was suspended and are now being granted for a one time visit, for a period of stay not exceeding three months. Add to that the inconvenience and cost of having to travel to a third country to process the visas. This is due to the suspension of consular activities by the U.S. in Cuba. A measure that was taken, under the excuse of the mysterious ‘sonic attacks.’  

These limitations have led (surely unwanted by the U.S. government) to the increase of visits by Cuban emigrants residing in the U.S. Almost half a million Cubans living in the U.S. visited the Island in 2019, an increase of 5.2 percent compared to 2018. And although, so far, they have not taken drastic measures to stop these visits, this possibility cannot be ruled out, as was the prohibition of U.S. airlines traveling to destinations other than Havana.

One might think that the current Cuban migrants are just another group of victims of the racism and xenophobia present in the immigration policy of the current U.S. administration. This is partly true. But the determining factor has been the pressure exerted by the Cuban-American extreme right — truly the main enemy of the people they claim to represent.

They are encouraged by fanaticism against the revolutionary process and they apply pressure so the population will “boil over.” However, beyond this political and ideological intransigence against Cuba, there are practical factors, of a domestic political nature, that better explain their rejection of the so-called ‘new emigrants,’ specifically those who arrived after 1980.

The migratory flow of these people is no longer functional to the extreme right. They respond to a social origin, an acquired culture and links with Cuban society that differentiate them from the so-called “historical exile” — the social base of these groups.

This does not make them defenders of the Cuban political system. The act of emigrating always involves a degree of dissatisfaction, which tends to be reflected in political attitudes. Especially in the case of Cuba, where emigration has been mixed with deep political conflicts whose consequences and prejudices have limited the articulation of a policy that, from its new condition, organically integrates these people into the national project.

And yet, it is also a fact that these new [Cuban] immigrants have helped weaken the conservative and Republican political monolith that characterized the Cuban-American community. The vast majority of these persons support relations with Cuba for sentimental and cultural reasons that transcend political differences with the Cuban government.

Under the current conditions, the new Cuban immigrants constitute the most dynamic factor in the demographic growth of the community, which implies significant changes in the political balance of the Cuban-American community. The extreme right has tried to counteract this by establishing limitations on their ability to enter the country, and by making their U.S. citizenship more difficult. 

They’ve set them as a bad example for the rest of the community who disrupt the base of the counterrevolutionary discourse. The Cuban right is correct in stating that those who visit Cuba the first chance they get cannot be considered enemies of the Cuban regime. In order to halt this, those who most benefitted from the Cuban Adjustment Act now propose to review it and help prevent these trips in the future.

Their aim is to sustain a climate of hostility whereby control over the rest of the community is based, as well as justifying its political prominence at the national level. For the extreme right it is essential to prevent coexistence between the two countries and the contact of emigrants with their homeland.

This implies a conflict not clearly perceived in the Miami political arena, because the new immigrants arrive with all kinds of disadvantages into a social microclimate where the codes of the extreme right prevail. In addition, they barely reach a quarter of the Cuban-American electorate, are the least economically favored, and have not been able to develop political organizations that distinguish them.

Even so, the right is clear that contacts with Cuban society are, in the long run, subversive to the prevailing order. Behind such innocent acts as celebrating Christmas Eve in Cuba, or the presentation of a Cuban artist in Miami, are subverted unbearable political implications that go against the discourse and agenda of the Cuban-American extreme right. It is why they react violently against them.

Hence the wisdom of a Cuban government policy more attentive to the interests of emigrants in their relations with Cuba, not only because of its strategic importance for the future of the nation, whatever the state of relations with the United States, but because it can stimulate a more determined political activism against the agenda that advocates hostility between the two countries. In this manner they can have a specific impact on the articulation of U.S. policy towards the Island.