The historical controversy surrounding February 24 in western Cuba (Final Part)

Beyond his designation by Martí as Military Chief of the West, General Julio Sanguily’s experience and prestige were determining factors in the success of the February 24 uprising, and his participation was key for many of the conspirators. After the uprising, the various rebel groups were to meet on the 28th in Corral Falso (today Pedro Betancourt) according to Sanguily’s order, and he would be there to take charge of command.

But Julio Sanguily was far from the committed person the other conspirators attributed to him. On the one hand, he was burdened by economic problems, the causes of which have been the subject of much speculation and questioning of his conduct.

He did nothing but ask Pedro Betancourt for money. In a letter dated Cerro, February 9, 1895, Sanguily wrote to him: “Yesterday I asked Joaquín Pedroso for a loan of 25 centenes, which I needed to go to the countryside today to retrieve my machete and revolver that I have pawned, and to leave something at home, but he did not give them to me; he told me he did not have them. So I cannot move because I do not even have anything to eat. I would like, and for that purpose, I am writing this letter for you to hurry up and get me the $2,500 that I need; not a cent less, because believe me, if I do not have it soon, the situation at home will be difficult. Furthermore, as I am, I do not have the mental capacity to deal with anything that interests me. Therefore, I ask you to send this as soon as possible so that I can focus solely on our business.”

On the eve of the uprising, with the order given by the Junta for the leaders to hide on the 20th and rise on the 24th, Julio Sanguily refused to comply. Juan Gualberto Gómez states, “Although we had decided that on February 20th, General Sanguily, General Aguirre, and I were going to leave Havana, we did not leave on the 20th, the 21st, or the 22nd; it was due to difficulties that arose, some of a material nature and others of a moral nature. I was prepared to leave for the location that had been indicated to me, but I did not want to disappear from Havana, leaving men like Aguirre and Sanguily in the capital. It seemed to me that they should leave before me, or at least together, and I urged them strongly. On February 22, I had some insight into General Sanguily’s inactivity. Around 2 p.m. on February 22, I saw General J. Sanguily arrive at my house with his brother, Colonel Manuel Sanguily. He arrived haughty, insolent, surly, and ill-humored, exhibiting an attitude bordering on impertinence. He said, ‘I have come to prevent you from doing something crazy. My brother has told me everything, and it is madness to want to stir up this country under these circumstances, without elements, resources, and preparation. So, I have come to prevent you from making that madness… and, as a last resort, if you want to do it, don’t involve my brother in that adventure.’

“I explained everything we were doing to show him that it was essential for General Julio Sanguily to go, especially if he didn’t want to lose his honor forever in the history of his people. Then, Manuel Sanguily turned sharply to Julio and said: ‘You haven’t shared all of this with me. Ah! This changes the situation entirely, and now I not only believe that you should go, that you must go, but that if I could, I would accompany you from now on.’

“All those hesitations then disappeared, and we decided… that on the 23rd, in any case, we would embark. On the 23rd, [Julio] came at 10 a.m. to inform me that, due to material difficulties, we could not embark and that we should leave together on the 24th in the morning. I resolutely opposed this. It was no longer possible for me to remain another hour in Havana; it was an extraordinary imprudence.”

Later, Juan Gualberto remarks: “… With the word given to me by General Aguirre and General Julio Sanguily to embark on the morning of February 24, because he could not do so with my company on the 23rd, I set out to meet those who were to accompany me to the appointment I was given in the province of Matanzas.”

As all the organizers had foreseen, Julio Sanguily was arrested that day by the Spanish authorities. In his book, Trelles states: “The main cause of the movement’s failure in Matanzas was the imprisonment of the aforementioned General. If he had heeded Juan Gualberto Gómez’s requests, who had urged him to disappear or hide from the 20th; or if he had followed the advice given by his illustrious brother Manuel on the afternoon of the 23rd, to leave or hide, and if he had managed to be in Ibarra on the 24th, the revolution would have gained significant momentum not only in Matanzas province but also in neighboring ones, making it almost certain that the problem of Cuba would have been resolved much sooner.”

Was Julio Sanguily in 1895 the same patriotic leader that Agramonte rescued from the hands of Spanish troops in 1871? What motivated his indecisive and apathetic behavior on this occasion? Historian Rolando Rodríguez García asserts that Julio Sanguily had the character of a traitor, whose tainted service record began to diminish, according to Vicente García, when he started trafficking goods for use in enemy enclaves in the jungle. Sanguily was almost certainly the informant to the Spanish high command on February 24, 1895. There is testimony regarding his stance on the uprising and documents indicating that he had received information about it from Captain General Emilio Calleja. Given his position, there is no doubt that these details came from him. Undoubtedly, Julio Sanguily was a significant traitor to Cuban independence.

Regarding his arrest on the morning of February 24, 1895, Rodriguez states: “He was not on the battlefield, but in his mansion in Cerro, where he was arrested, almost certainly to provide him with an alibi.”

On the eve of the 24th

On the eve of that famous day in Cuban history, Juan Gualberto Gómez left Havana, guided by López Coloma, who had been assigned by the leaders of Matanzas to accompany him. He landed in the afternoon in Ibarra, very close to the demolished La Ignacia sugar mill, where he was to meet with the forces that would rise up in that province.

For his part, Gómez recounts his detailed version of events: “I went to La Ignacia, following the instructions of Dr. Betancourt, the head of the conspiracy in the province of Matanzas. On the night of the 23rd to the 24th, around 400 men were supposed to gather in Ibarra, at the head of which would be Dr. Betancourt, initiating the movement in La Ignacia on Sunday, February 24, and carrying out whatever operations he could to arrive on Thursday, February 28, at Corral Falso, where the other rebel groups would be, in order to place themselves under the superior command of General J. Sanguily, Head of the Western Department.”

Gómez, López Coloma, and 14 others arrived at La Ignacia on the night of the 23rd, but Betancourt did not arrive until the morning of the 24th. Juan Gualberto’s group had already abandoned the place, pursued by Spanish troops. That disagreement was fatal for the uprising.

Betancourt writes in his letter to Juan Gualberto: “… at that time (the night of the 23rd), I believed you were still in Havana because I had not received news of your arrival in Ibarra. I received that information three hours later, at 11:00 p.m., from Bonifacio Gómez. Through him, I learned that you were waiting for me in Ibarra, and I would have gone there immediately if my duties and commitments as president of the Committee had not forced me to remain in the city.”

Response from the leaders of the Matanzas groups

It can be said that almost all the leaders of the Matanzas groups committed to the uprising left Betancourt “hanging” on that February 24th. They demanded from him “as a sine qua non condition… clear proof of the presence already in the camp of the military chief of the province, General Julio Sanguily,” adding that “they had certain news… that said chief would not leave Havana, leaving our organization headless.”

Betancourt concludes by reporting to his former chief: “In this desperate situation and fearing worse evils, I hugged the flanks of my horse, departing from Matanzas and heading for Ibarra at eleven in the morning on February 24, 1895.” However, Betancourt did not arrive on time.

Uprisings and disagreements

On that Sunday morning, the 24th, Pedro Betancourt, accompanied by Pedro Acevedo, went to the La Ignacia sugar mill, where they planned to meet Juan Gualberto and López Coloma. Instead, Spanish troops waited for them at the batey, and they were saved thanks to Acevedo spotting them in time. They inquired with the neighbors about Juan Gualberto’s group and searched the jungle but without success. López Coloma and Juan Gualberto’s group had left La Ignacia hours earlier after receiving a notice from their cousin, the head of the Ibarra station, informing them that the conspiracy had been discovered.

Betancourt and Pedro Acevedo returned to San José, where the Calzadilla group was. At 5 p.m. on the 24th, not a single man from the other groups had shown up, and the group led by Betancourt never rose up.

During the early hours of the 25th, Pedro Betancourt and Guillermo Acevedo searched those towns for Juan Gualberto and his group. At dawn, they separated, fearing capture. On the morning of the 27th, Betancourt sent a man to Matanzas to inquire about the situation. He learned that only a few had left the city on the 24th and that they had all returned to their homes that night. The movement had failed.

Detention

Betancourt tells Gómez that in the town of Cidra, he changed his clothes and took the train to Matanzas. Upon arriving at the station, Commander Bisbé of the Civil Guard detained him and took him to General Prats, the Military Governor of the province, who asked him to declare himself in favor of laying down his arms. When he refused, he was taken to the Castle of San Severino and the next day to Havana to present himself to the Captain General. He was presented to General Calleja, who received him very courteously and asked him to help influence the revolutionaries to lay down their arms. When he refused, Calleja informed him that, in order to avoid internment in La Cabaña, he was forced to deport him immediately to Spain. He gave instructions for the ocean liner Montevideo to delay its departure and handed him over to Colonel Pagliery, head of Public Order, who took him to lunch and continuously tried to persuade him to assist General Calleja in pacifying the country.

After fleeing La Ignacia, López Coloma’s group camped in Cueval de Santa Elena in the nearby mountains. On the 28th, Spanish troops surrounded them. López Coloma was the first to be taken prisoner. Juan Gualberto, Torres, Latapier, and Treviño reached the La Concepción farm, near the Vellocino sugar mill, with difficulty. The others dispersed.

Juan Gualberto Gómez and his two companions were taken to Sabanilla by Dr. Leoncio Junco, the President of the Autonomist Committee and Deputy Mayor of Sabanilla, along with Mr. Felipe Montes de Oca, a friend of Juan Gualberto and the owner of the Vellocino sugar mill. They chose to accept the pardon offered by the governor of the island, which he later retracted. They brought him to the town hall, from where he was taken prisoner to the Palace. Both he and Coloma were sentenced to 20 years in prison in Ceuta for the crime of rebellion. López Coloma received a new trial in Havana, where he was sentenced to death and executed by firing squad in La Cabaña.

Historian Pérez Guzmán summarizes it as follows: “Of the 500 men who were expected to take up arms in the Matanzas jungle on the night of the 24th, only about 50 did so. The insurrection in the West appeared doomed to failure. The military leader of the uprising, General Julio Sanguily, was arrested at his home. The individual responsible for the movement in Matanzas, Pedro Betancourt, failed to carry out the actions anticipated by Juan Gualberto Gómez and was also arrested and later deported to Spain. Another key conspirator, José María Aguirre, was caught by the Spanish authorities. The murder of Manuel García in Ceiba Mocha signaled the end of the bad news.”

Epilogue

The armed uprising for Cuban independence on February 24, 1895, failed in Matanzas. There were no uprisings in Las Villas or Camagüey, nor did the anticipated landings of expeditions and esteemed leaders of the Great War to support the rebels occur for several weeks, as planned by Martí and Máximo Gómez. Only in the East did Guillermón Moncada, Bartolomé Masó, and other patriots ignite the flame of the insurrection that would not be extinguished until victory was achieved. The war would reach the West a year later with the invasion commanded by Lieutenant General Antonio Maceo, and Matanzas awaited its turn to engage in battle eagerly.

After escaping Spanish exile and reaching American soil, Betancourt joined three expeditions before finally returning to Cuba, landing in Baracoa, Oriente, on March 25, 1896, and arriving in his home province at the end of June. In July, Captain Betancourt was assigned to organize the Matanzas Western Brigade. For a year and a half, he fought effectively and bravely in one of the most challenging theaters of the war, ultimately concluding it with the rank of brigadier general in command of the 1st Division of the 5th Army Corps, which comprised four brigades.

Many wars and revolutions begin with military defeats that later become moral victories. February 24, 1895, proved to be such a victory.

Rafael Betancourt is an economist and university professor. Email: rbetancourt3114@gmail.com.

The historical controversy surrounding February 24 in western Cuba (Part 1+Español)