In April 2015, do Cuban-Americans matter?

HAVANA — A recent survey by pollsters Bendixen & Amandi International reveals that a majority in the Cuban-American community (51 percent) support President Barack Obama’s new policy toward Cuba.

Actually, this is not a surprising bit of news; rather, it confirms a trend that has been manifesting itself for years. The question is, then, how important is this result for the future development of relations between the two countries.

Apart from other components, the attitude of Cuban-Americans regarding policy toward Cuba has had a symbolic impact on the rest of U.S. society. For years, this attitude was utilized as an argument that legitimized the most aggressive policies, to the point that many, even in Cuba, came to believe the tale that U.S. policy toward the island was decided by the Cuban-American far right in Miami.

This logic determined that those U.S. sectors that proposed a change sought allies in the Cuban-American community, increasing the specific weight of Cuban-Americans also in that current. That explains the acceptance given to the so-called “moderates” in recent years and it shouldn’t be ruled out that their activity influenced the measures finally adopted by President Obama.

However, this picture has changed significantly now that these decisions have been made. The Cuban-American far right has demonstrated a slim capacity to articulate a common front, even among the Republicans, to revert Obama’s policy, and the moderates have lost the relevance they had when it was necessary to facilitate the consensus for change.

The main negotiations between the two countries are conducted by representatives of the two governments, and other sectors of power — say, legislators or large businesses — do not need intermediaries to link up with their Cuban counterparts.

In sum, the Cuban-American political groups, whatever the current of thought that they may represent, have lost their leading role in the design and implementation of U.S. policy toward Cuba. But this does not mean that the Cuban-American community is ignored in the equation of U.S.-Cuba relations.

To Cuban-Americans, policy toward Cuba has always carried an important weight for the tilt of their vote. What’s novel about the current situation, appreciable since 2008, is that, in the cost-benefit calculation that rules U.S. political campaigns, to support measures that improve relations between the two countries has ceased to be a net loss, as was in the past.

So much so, that it could be said that this change was one of the factors that pushed President Obama to make the decisions he announced on Dec. 17.

It could be argued that such an assertion is exaggerated, if we take into account that the Cuban-American vote is not decisive, not even in South Florida, much less on a national scale. However, it matters, like any other electoral segment, in one of the nation’s most important states, where elections are always hard fought. It also matters because of the symbolic effect mentioned earlier.

Because the far right’s agenda is based on belligerence against Cuba, the Cuban-Americans’ majority support for an improvement in relations also can translate into relevant changes in the local political balance, with implications for the power structure that historically has predominated in that community.

Even more important, the result of this and other surveys announces the emergence of a more convenient environment for the development of relations between the two countries. This implies that both the state of Florida in general and the Cuban-American community in particular can take advantage of the opportunities that come with the new juncture.

Although not completely alienated from the process and although the very market logic tends to bring them in gradually, Florida’s economic sectors’ limited leading role by in the changes in policy toward Cuba can be explained only by the pressures from the Cuban-American extreme right, given that no other state will benefit more from the opening of the Cuban market to the United States.

In the case of the Cuban-American community, that obstacle is even more counterproductive, because it clashes with the logical process of economic interaction between both societies.

Some specialists estimate that half of the money that reaches Cuba through remittances — some $2 billion, by most accounts — is invested in working capital for the small businesses that are developed on the island.

No Cuban law forbids this capital to grow and be invested in other lines, but its full materialization will have to overcome the historical mistrust generated by the actions of the Cuban-American far right against the nation, as well as the actions of other currents that now advocate changing the methods but not the “regime-change” objectives that animate U.S. policy toward Cuba.

As a result, it matters much that a majority of Cuban-Americans support an improvement in relations and that this support translates into the defense of a climate of true coexistence and mutual respect between the two countries.

In the long run, this benefits everyone, except those who are no longer a majority and grow fewer with every passing day.

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