Cuba: An unusual battle in Washington

HAVANA — Because of the polarization that exists between Democrats and Republicans, the recent creation of the bipartisan coalition Engage Cuba, intended to promote relations with the island, is rare. Suffice it to analyze its composition to notice its singularity.

Its president is James Williams, a young consultant who was an adviser to U.S. Secretary of State John Kerry, and Washington bureau chief for Trimpa Group, a Democratic organization based in Colorado that specializes in the promotion of — in their words — “progressive policies and strategies.”

Also from the Democratic ranks comes one of the so-called “senior advisers,” Lucas Albee, who was chief of staff to senators Mark Warner and Patrick Leahy, two of the main promoters of a change of policy toward Cuba in that organization.

Joining them with the same title of senior adviser is Stephen Law, with vast experience in the conservative Republican ranks. He was Under Secretary of Labor during the administration of George W. Bush; former chief of staff of the current Republican majority leader in the Senate, Mitch McConnell; former executive in the U.S. Chamber of Commerce, and no less than president of the Republican Super PAC American Crossroads, founded by Karl Rove, strategist par excellence in the political campaigns that carried Bush Jr. to the presidency and guided his administration.

As reported last April in the Wall Street Journal, Engage Cuba will also have two prominent Republican lobbyists from the firm Fierce Government Relations. Former Bush Jr. aide Kirsten Chadwick, will lead the lobby in the House of Representatives, while Billy Piper, another former aide to Senator Mitch McConnell, will do something similar in the Senate. The same source points out that Luis Miranda, an aide to President Obama, was one of the people who conceived the creation of Engage Cuba and has contributed to its materialization.

What’s the explanation for this extravagant alliance and what are its chances for success?

There is no explanation, other than the interest in Cuba among a broad spectrum of the U.S. economic sectors. This is reflected in the composition of the coalition, which  lists some of the most important consortiums and business associations in the United States, encompassing issues as diverse as farming, machine production, telecommunications and tourism.

In some cases, this interest is easily explained by the specific opportunities that the Cuban market can bring to some of these companies.

According to estimates from Engage Cuba itself, the Cuban market could eventually rise to $6 billion a year, nothing to sneer at. This volume would increase significantly if the tourism industry continues to develop, Cuban products are allowed to enter the U.S. market, and the crude oil reserves that appear to exist in Cuba’s territorial waters can be exploited.

Nevertheless, by itself, in comparative terms, this does not convert the Cuban market into a big business for U.S. companies. From my point of view, its true importance lies in what Cuba can contribute to the better operation of the U.S. domestic market and its exports to other countries. Three reasons determine this potential: geography, human capital, and Cuba’s political and social stability.

Cuba’s geographic location has been seen historically from two contradictory perspectives: as a virtue that has catapulted its importance to an international level every since the times of Spanish colonization, and as a disgrace conditioned by its dependency on the United States — the so-called “manifest destiny” that often served as an argument to demobilize national struggles.

Either way, it is a fact that its nearness to the United States inserts Cuba into the logic of U.S. trade beyond a bilateral interest. Whether to gain more efficient access to foreign products, process them and distribute them in the national market, or to project its exports toward the rest of America and Europe, Cuba’s geographic location acquires a strategic importance for the U.S. economy.

Add to this logic the human capital that exists in Cuba. Few are the places where U.S. companies can find such a qualified labor force. That implies that the basic interest should be directed not at reproducing the maquiladoras that exist elsewhere but to propitiate more complex productive activities that include the use of new technology, the production of software and the development of scientific research, so as to integrate them into the value chains created by the so-called “knowledge revolution” that is taking place in Cuba.

For these plans to proceed well, a climate of social and political stability is essential in Cuba. So it’s paradoxical that official U.S. policy is to “change the regime” that offers those very advantages.

That’s not a surprise, however. Those contradictions are present in many other aspects of U.S. foreign policy, to the point that occasionally it is difficult to identify the United States’ real “national interest.” Cuban policy will also have to deal with this reality, in order to determine its actions.

These strategic considerations are meaningless, however, under the rules imposed by the economic blockade. That explains the emergency of endeavors like Engage Cuba and the urgency of important economic sectors in the U.S. to dismantle the remnants of the current policy against Cuba.

Engage Cuba’s chances for success lie in the fact that its task responds to objective factors related to the United States’ own interests, something that, in turn, highlights the historical lack of synchronicity of its opponents and the resulting lack of popularity of their positions.

For Cuba, this is a process that overflows the dimension of its national economy and bilateral relations with the U.S., while it makes it the focus of interest for other countries, vis-à-vis access to the U.S. market, maximizing its importance on an international scale.

There’s also the danger of renewed dependency. The old dilemma about the advantages and disadvantages of economic relations with the United States comes up once again. That will determine how the exercise of national policy on a domestic and worldwide scale will navigate the complex conditions imposed by the “normalization” of relations with the United States.