Before privatizing state assets, ask: Who gets to buy them, who will monitor the process?

Economist Pedro Monreal argues that Cuba’s recently announced package of 176 economic measures could substantially increase the risk of corruption, particularly through the proposed transformation and possible privatization of state-owned enterprises and assets. His main concern is that the government is opening the door to private ownership without first establishing the independent institutions and safeguards needed to prevent political insiders, government officials, or their associates from capturing public assets.

Monreal describes this as the potential creation of a “crony capitalism” system, in which people with political connections could benefit from the sale or transfer of state property. He argues that the package’s anticorruption provisions are inadequate. The existing proposal largely leaves oversight within the same state-and-party structure that controls the assets and their disposition.

His first major proposal is to establish a truly independent supreme auditing institution. He argues that the current Comptroller General of the Republic is not sufficiently independent because it is subordinate to the president and lacks unrestricted authority over all areas of the public sector. In particular, he points to the exclusion of entities such as GAESA from effective external scrutiny.

Monreal proposes giving the Comptroller a fixed 10-year term, protection from arbitrary dismissal, its own budget and personnel, unrestricted access to government documents and financial records, and the authority to publish its findings without executive approval. Most importantly, all public resources—including military-related entities, mixed companies, and GAESA—would fall under its auditing authority.

The second—and larger—part of his proposal addresses who should be prohibited from participating in privatization transactions. He recommends restrictions not only for government officials but also for Communist Party officials, municipal authorities, directors of state enterprises, military-controlled entities, and certain members of their immediate families. He also proposes identifying the ultimate beneficial owner of every private company seeking to acquire a state asset, making it harder to hide politically connected buyers behind shell companies or intermediaries.

A key proposal is a 36-month “cooling-off” period after officials leave office. During that period, they would be prohibited from acquiring assets they previously regulated, supervised, valued, or helped sell. Similar restrictions would apply to relatives and business partners. Violations could result in the cancellation of the transaction, confiscation of profits, and a 10-year prohibition on holding public office or contracting with the state.

Monreal also calls for public disclosure and citizen participation. Privatization proposals should be published before approval, including the asset’s valuation, the bidders and their ultimate owners, the evaluation process, and the final price. Citizens should have a period to challenge suspicious transactions, while workers at the affected enterprise should elect observers to monitor the process. Serious allegations of conflicts of interest or undervaluation could temporarily halt a sale.

He also wants stronger rules specifically for Communist Party officials. Political endorsements should not influence privatization decisions, and party officials should be subject to the same conflict-of-interest rules as government officials. Using party authority to benefit relatives or politically connected companies should be treated as a serious offense.

Finally, Monreal argues that oversight cannot end once an asset is sold. The government should retain the ability to reverse transactions for five years after privatization if hidden conflicts of interest or politically connected beneficiaries are discovered. He also calls for confidential protections for whistleblowers who expose irregularities.

In essence, Monreal’s warning is simple: Cuba may need economic reform and greater private participation, but privatization without transparency, independent auditing, public scrutiny, and clear rules on who can buy state property could turn economic reform into an opportunity for political insiders to appropriate public wealth. As he puts it at the end, if Cuba does not establish now who can legitimately buy state assets, it may later become impossible to distinguish economic reform from “looting.”