The path to relations between Cuba and the U.S.

The second round of talks between the governments of Cuba and the United States was held in Washington on Feb. 27. The press has published much comment about this meeting, but it seems to me most important to analyze how this step fits in the path of what’s been called “the normalization” of relations between the two countries.

As I wrote in a commentary published by Progreso Weekly right after the meeting, from my point of view, the most qualitatively important of what happened after Dec. 17 is that two countries practically incapable of communicating for more than half a century adopted the means of negotiation for the solution of their conflicts.

This decision does not put an end to the conflicts, but they tend to diminish and it becomes possible to solve them — or at least deal with them — within the norms established by international law.

For years, I would say since the very triumph of the Revolution, Cuba’s only demand has been to negotiate with the United States under conditions of equality and mutual respect, which evidently it has achieved.

I don’t think that negotiation is a science, as some specialists affirm, but professionalism and the characteristics of the people involved do matter. The best negotiators are those capable of moving within the boundaries imposed by their government’s agendas, and they act courteously enough so that the style does not determine the outcome.

Flexibility has been a hallmark of these meetings, which demonstrates that dogmatic people can never be good negotiators.

At this point of the process, the most problematic issues are the elimination of Cuba from the list of countries that promote terrorism, and the rules established for the behavior of U.S. diplomats in Cuba once the embassies are opened.

Truth is, if we look at the whole of the restrictions imposed by the blockade upon Cuba (in the U.S., they call it “embargo” but that word means something else), they exceed those established by the U.S. government for the other countries on the list of promoters of terrorism.

To Cuba, it is vital to be eliminated from that list. In the first place, because doing so constitutes an act of “justice,” as expressed by Josefina Vidal, chief of the Cuban delegation, and that fits in the respect being requested.

Also, because appearing on that list infringes on the guarantees that the United States should offer to a country with which it proposes to maintain normal relations.

The U.S. government has shown signs that it will eliminate Cuba from the list. What’s odd is that it didn’t do so earlier, thus placing itself in the situation of negotiating with a country that it describes as terrorist, which weakens its position vis-à-vis its domestic opponents.

Nevertheless, the U.S. insists that it is a matter of domestic affairs, separate from the negotiations, so it cannot be a Cuban precondition for the agreements.

Havana accepts this interpretation but insists that Cuba’s permanence on the list does not contribute to the climate that should prevail in the negotiations: the precondition is respect, not the list by itself.

In addition, it is convenient for Cuba to establish the principle that affairs of a domestic nature do not become part of the agenda of negotiations, as the U.S. is trying to do in other aspects.

In the end, this is a matter that needs to be settled soon, primarily because, as expressed by Roberta Jacobson, chief of the U.S. delegation, the U.S. expects to solve the issue of the reestablishment of diplomatic relations with Cuba before the next Summit of the Americas, set for April in Panama.

The reasons have to do with U.S. strategy toward Latin America, but that is a matter that goes beyond the purpose of this article and can be dealt with later.

The other topic at issue, the norms that must rule the work of U.S. diplomats in Cuba, is broader than it seems.

In the National Security Strategy published recently by the U.S. government, the U.S. reaffirms its alleged right to intervene in the domestic affairs of other countries, with a view to “promoting democracy” in them.

Sometimes it is difficult to convince the American people, even some of its diplomats, that their country does not have the right to do so, and that such a purpose is not imbued with the noble intentions it proclaims.

I do not know a single case of a Third World country where U.S. intervention has led to the full exercise of democracy, justice and popular felicity. There is a surfeit of examples, some very recent, that demonstrate this assertion.

In reality, it is a policy (previously covert) that has no legal justification. The U.S. has tried to legitimize it since the 1980s, with the creation of the National Endowment for Democracy (NED), the activities of the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) and other mechanisms that function openly in almost every country and are the sources of disputes with many countries.

In the case of Cuba, this translates into specific programs designed for a “regime change,” an euphemism for the overthrow of the Cuban government. Many of these programs are still protected by the Bush Plan, an abomination spawned by the far right that totally contradicts the new policy advocated by President Obama and even acts against it.

Within this scheme, the U.S. Interests Section in Havana has acted more like a center for conspiracy than as a diplomatic representation, and that’s what worries the Cuban government.

According to the U.S., what’s involved here is to allow U.S. diplomats to relate freely with Cuban society. But the problem is not in relating but in how to relate and for what.

Everybody knows that one of the functions of every embassy is to exert influence on the host society, in function of its national interests. But there are international norms that establish the parameters of these interests and the manner in which they may be promoted, in line with the respect for the sovereignty of the states.

The Vienna Convention and the United Nations Charter instituted those rules and Cuba-U.S. diplomatic relations will likely be reestablished under their principles. However, their observance will surely be one more source of conflict between the two countries in the foreseeable future.

Nobody should assume that we’re witnessing the consummation of a marriage between Cuba and the United States. Rather, we’re seeing the negotiations for the terms of a divorce whose causes go back to the 19th Century and which became irreconcilable in 1959.

Let us hope, then, that love and trust are not brought into the picture and that the old grievances are not forgotten, especially by Cuba, which has been the most aggrieved in this relationship.

At least the parties have decided to talk and not to fling dishes at each other’s head.

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