Elections in Brazil and pan-American geopolitics

The government of the United States, knife and fork at the ready, must have been salivating in August and early September, expecting that Marina Silva would serve it, on a silver platter, the filet mignon of Brazilian sovereignty — assuming that Silva becomes President of Brazil after a second round at the polls in late October.

Almost all analyses indicate that, in next Sunday’s election, incumbent President Dilma Rousseff will win handsomely, although her victory will not be enough to clinch the presidency, which will be on the balance on Oct. 26.

Less than a week ago, it seemed that a second round would be risky for Dilma’s re-election, because Silva could be reinforced by supporters of Aecio Neves, or Neves by supporters of Silva, if Neves surprises Silva, who was predicted to come in second in the first round.

Now, according to the pollsters at Datafolha, Rousseff clearly leads the race by 15 percentage points: 40 for her, 25 for Silva. This poll has so buoyed her supporters that there is talk that, in the first round, Rousseff will have a 20-point advantage over her closest challenger and will go on to win next Sunday’s election with more than 50 percent of the votes, as a Rousseff campaign organizer pointed out.

Anyway, it seems clear that a solid victory by the incumbent President this weekend will boost the trend in the last few days that shows Silva losing supporters while Rousseff gathers them.

This behavior on the part of voters is mostly explained by the persistent realization that, behind her sweet talk, Silva conceals the worn-out neoliberal project known as “pure and hard,” tested by President Fernando Henrique Cardoso in the 1990s. That project ended in a resounding economic failure and the consequent loss of political power by the right, from 2002 until today.

The re-issue of an unbridled neoliberalism that sacrifices public gains on the altar of the market and international capital would represent the loss of valuable social, political and economic gains and turn Brazil’s current foreign policy upside down.

In fact, Marina Silva and several leaders of the Brazilian Socialist Party (PSB) have proposed “re-launching” relations with the United States, making MERCOSUR “flexible,” reviewing Brazil’s role in the BRICS bloc (Brazil, Russia, India, China, South Africa), and rethinking all options for South-South cooperation.

Mauricio Rands, coordinator of the PSB campaign, put it succinctly: “Obama will find much affinity with Marina Silva’s Brazil.”

The Brazil that Rands refers to would have little to do with the efforts for integration in Latin America and the Caribbean and with the various institutions that have been created in the region to propel continental unity and the defense of national sovereignty.

A triumph by Silva would give her an opportunity to show her affinity with Washington at the Summit of the Americas, to be held in Panama in April 2015.

A Brazil led by Marina Silva would no doubt have helped Obama to deal with the difficult dilemmas presented by Cuba’s attendance to that meeting, at the invitation of Panama.

Now it is said that, if Obama attends, the United States’ far right will pillory him for bowing to Cuban diplomacy and the demands of a large number of regional nations.

And if he doesn’t show up in Panama he will also be charged with contributing to the extinction of the only truly continental forum where the U.S. can exchange and debate ideas and influence with all the countries in the region.

But if Marina is elected — I’m just saying, “if” — Obama could lean on the pronouncements of the Brazilian giant, no less. Her speech would be a copy of the very manipulated argument of human-rights violations in Cuba, a cantilena that the U.S. has sung to justify a harsh economic blockade and a longstanding undeclared war against the small Caribbean island.

Maybe a scenario like that one would encourage Obama to attend the Summit and try to legitimize a heavily retouched portrait of his country’s irrepressible hegemony. It would be a good opportunity to put on the table the poisoned apple of the Pacific Alliance bloc created by the U.S., with the partnership of Colombia, Chile, Mexico and Peru.

That, however, is very unlikely, because the forces of Dilma Rousseff, catalyzed by the Lula factor, seem to have found the road to victory.

And even if Brazil’s progressive and nationalistic forces win, the victors will have to weigh that triumph against the elements of defeat — which were present — to draw final conclusions and make necessary improvements.

Latin Americans and Caribbeans have much to learn from this experience.