Wikileaks 2005: cable from European Commissioner Louis Michel – emphasis on Felipe Perez Roque

ID: 30970

Date: 2005-04-18 13:51:00

Origin: 05BRUSSELS1530

Source: Embassy Brussels

Classification: CONFIDENTIAL

Dunno: 05BRUSSELS1217 05BRUSSELS1389 05STATE50857

Destination: This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 BRUSSELS 001530

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/18/2015

TAGS: PREL, PHUM, PINR, EAID, CU, EUN, USEU BRUSSELS

SUBJECT: CUBA: EU COMMISSIONER MICHEL BOLSTERS CUBAN FONMIN

REF: A. A) BRUSSELS 1389

B. B) BRUSSELS 1217

C. C) STATE 50857

Classified By: USEU POLOFF TOOD HUIZINGA, FOR REASONS 1.4 (B) AND (D)

1. (C) SUMMARY: According to his adviser on Cuba, European

Commissioner for Development Louis Michel believes the EU

must bolster Cuban FM Felipe Perez Roque as the best hope for

improved EU-Cuba relations. During his March 24-27 visit to

the island (REFS B-C), Michel offered Perez Roque better

relations with the EU, apparently implying that the EU wished

to offset the U.S. embargo. Michel reportedly was struck by

the “frozen” world-view of the other Cuban officials he met,

including Castro, who appeared to believe Cuba’s

relationships with Venezuela and China rendered closer

relations with the EU unnecessary. Michel’s analysis of

EU-Cuba relations seems unaffected by his meetings with the

opposition. He believes the U.S. embargo soured the

Communist experiment on the island, and that “constructive

engagement” with Cuba is the EU’s only alternative. His view

has the upper hand in the EU, but continued Cuban

intransigence could result in pressure to toughen EU policy

by the time of the EU’s June/July Cuba policy review. END

SUMMARY.

———————-

A CONFIDENTIAL READOUT

———————-

2. (C) XXXXXXXXXXXX (STRICTLY PROTECT), who covers

Cuba in the cabinet of European Commissioner for Development

Louis Michel, called Poloff on April 14 for a “confidential”

readout of Michel’s March 24-27 visit to Cuba. XXXXXXXXXXXX

accompanied Michel to the island and attended all of his

meetings except the encounter with Castro. During his trip

Michel met with Perez Roque, Vice President of the Council of

State Carlos Lage, National Assembly President Ricardo

Alarcon, Minister of Foreign Investment and Economic

Cooperation Marta Lomas and, for three hours, with Fidel

Castro. In addition, Michel met Cardinal Jaime Ortega and

Cuban opposition figures Oswaldo Paya, Marta Beatriz Roque,

Vladimiro Roca and the Women in White, a group of wives and

family members of imprisoned dissidents. XXXXXXXXXXXX said he

had offered the readout to assure Poloff that Michel fully

shared the objective of democratic transition in Cuba and had

reasons for his differences with the U.S. on tactics.

—————————

PEREZ ROQUE: THE GREAT HOPE

—————————

3. (C) XXXXXXXXXXXX repeated often that Perez Roque was the only

Cuban official Michel met with whom it was possible to have a

give-and-take discussion. Perez Roque appeared to be looking

ahead to a post-Castro era, and thinking pragmatically about

how to pursue Cuba’s present and future interests. In this

context, he listened with interest to Michel’s suggestion

that Cuba join the Cotonou Agreement and thereby establish a

comprehensive basis for closer political, trade and

development-assistance relations with the EU. (NOTE: The

Cotonou Agreement is the framework for

development-assistance, trade and political relations between

the EU and the 79 members of the African, Caribbean and

Pacific Group of States. In exchange for a more favorable

trade and aid relationship, Cotonou would commit Cuba to a

regular political and human rights dialogue with the EU. END

NOTE.) According to XXXXXXXXXXXX, Michel told Perez Roque that

a Cotonou-based relationship with the EU could act as a

counterbalance to Cuba’s isolation from the U.S. He further

suggested that, under Cotonou, the EU might be able to help

the Cubans in sending medical doctors to countries in the

region, as they are doing in Venezuela.

——————————

PEREZ ROQUE NONCOMMITTAL TO EU

——————————

4. (C) Perez Roque’s response to the Cotonou offer was

noncommittal. XXXXXXXXXXXX said the Cuban FM’s negotiating

style could be described as “I’ll tell you the time if you

give me your watch.” In that spirit, Perez Roque repeatedly

told Michel the prerequisite for closer EU-Cuba ties was the

EU’s dropping support for the U.S. CHR resolution on Cuba.

Denying that Michel had ever advocated dropping support,

XXXXXXXXXXXX said that Michel’s response was always that (1)

Cuba must release its imprisoned dissidents; and (2) since

the CHR resolution was purely procedural, the EU could not

fail to support it. XXXXXXXXXXXX said Michel raised the

possibility of Cuba’s inviting UN High Commissioner for Human

Rights Louise Arbour or her Cuba Representative Christine

Chanet to visit the island, in order to signal Cuba’s desire

to work with the international community. According to

XXXXXXXXXXXX, Perez Roque said he would consider the idea but

never followed up.

—————————————–

MICHEL’S EFFUSIVENESS WAS FOR PEREZ ROQUE

—————————————–

5. (C) XXXXXXXXXXX said Michel was quite aware that trying to

buttress Perez Roque was a risk. No one could be sure

whether he was acting in good faith in his contacts with the

EU, or simply “the smartest” member of a completely

intransigent regime. Nonetheless, Michel felt that Perez

Roque represented the EU’s only hope of influencing Cuba

toward reform and respect for human rights. XXXXXXXXXXX said

Michel’s effusive public optimism about EU-Cuba relations

after the visit was meant to bolster Perez Roque. In

reality, said XXXXXXXXXXXX, Michel came away sobered and

distressed. Perez Roque would have to come through soon,

said XXXXXXXXXXXX, by freeing more dissidents or allowing the UN

human rights visit, or Michel and the Spaniards would no

longer be able to advocate full constructive engagement.

When pressed on whether “soon” meant before the upcoming

June/July review of EU Cuba policy, XXXXXXXXXXXX said, “we’ll

probably have to give him more time than that.”

———————————-

MICHEL: CASTRO, OTHERS, DELUSIONAL

———————————-

6. (C) XXXXXXXXXXXX was at pains to contrast Perez Roque with

the other Cuban officials they had met. XXXXXXXXXXXX said

Michel was struck by how “frozen” and delusional Cuban

officials’ view of the world was. The meeting with Vice

President of the Council of State Carlos Lage was emblematic

of this, said XXXXXXXXXXXX. Lage seemed truly to believe that

all was well on the island, that time was on Cuba’s side

regarding the U.S. embargo, that the Cuban peso revaluation

would make the economy strong and, above all, that Cuba’s

growing relations with Venezuela and China rendered closer

relations with the EU unnecessary. Although XXXXXXXXXXXX did

not attend the meeting with Castro, Michel told him the

three-hour encounter started with an almost surreal tour

through a room Castro had showcasing Chinese products as if

it were a museum exhibition. Castro, too, seemed fixated on

Venezuela and China. Although the Alarcon meeting was less

substantive, according to XXXXXXXXXXXX, Alarcon expressed views

similar to Lage. XXXXXXXXXXXX said Minister of Foreign

Investment and Economic Cooperation Marta Lomas was the most

wooden of all, sticking so close to her talking points that

no exchange was possible.

————————————-

MICHEL: EMBARGO FEEDS CUBAN DELUSIONS

————————————-

7. (C) XXXXXXXXXXXX stressed that a central element of the

official Cubans’ world-view was the U.S. embargo. The Cuban

David had weathered the American Goliath’s embargo for forty

years, proving the regime’s strength and lending it moral

legitimacy. XXXXXXXXXXXX said Michel felt vindicated in his

opposition to the embargo, since he had now witnessed the

role it played in Cuban officials’ delusions. XXXXXXXXXXXX

added that Michel believed that Communism might have turned

out well for Cuba if the embargo had not helped push the

regime down the hard-line path. This was yet another reason,

XXXXXXXXXXXX said, to choose a Cuba policy of engagement rather

than isolation.

——————————————-

OPPOSITION: LITTLE EFFECT ON MICHEL’S VIEWS

——————————————-

8. (C) Michel’s analysis of EU-Cuba relations seems

unaffected by his meetings with the opposition and the

Church. XXXXXXXXXXXX said Michel had three separate meetings

with dissidents, one with Oswaldo Paya, another with Marta

Beatriz Roque and Vladimiro Roca, and a third with the Women

in White. XXXXXXXXXXXX said little of note was discussed during

the Paya meeting, and that Roca was the only opposition

figure who completely opposed the lifting of the EU measures.

Beatriz Roque, said XXXXXXXXXXXX, opposed it as well, but was

willing to wait and see what the upshot would be. The Women

in White made a deep impression on Michel, according to

XXXXXXXXXXXX, with their personal stories. However, they did

not discuss policy. XXXXXXXXXXXX had little of substance to say

about Michel’s meeting with Cardinal Jaime Ortega.

—————————————

MICHEL GOING TO MAT FOR FULL ENGAGEMENT

—————————————

9. (C) COMMENT: Michel apparently will stop supporting full

constructive engagement with Cuba only if Cuban intransigence

— and pressure from within the EU — makes his position

politically untenable. He is also willing to sell the EU

approach to the Cubans as a counterweight to the U.S.

embargo. Our sense is that this attitude, buttressed by

Spanish support, is still carrying the day in the EU. (NOTE:

On April 15, Perez Roque called EU support for the CHR

resolution on Cuba “pathetic;” a Commission spokeswoman’s

response was to say that the EU supported the resolution

because it did not condemn the Cuban authorities. END NOTE.)

As the June/July review of EU Cuba policy approaches, the

commitment of anti-Castro member states such as the Czech

Republic and Poland, and, in Brussels, of the center-right

activists in the European Parliament (REF A) will be key. If

the Castro regime remains as uncompromising as it has been in

its reaction to the CHR resolution, they might have a window

of opportunity to modify the current policy of full

engagement. END COMMENT.

SCHNABEL