The Cuban-American community: Its future and relations with Cuba
By Jesús Arboleya Cervera
HAVANA – Much is said about the changes taking place in the Cuban-American community as a result of the arrival of the “new émigrés.” In this regard, emphasis is placed on their differences from the so-called “historic exiles,” who so far have been the political base for the dominant right-wing sectors.
That conclusion can be said to be accurate. Evidently, the new émigrés come from class and historical origins that are different from their predecessors’, so their growing demographic weight in the Cuban-American ensemble is already being expressed in their political leanings, particularly as they apply to relations with Cuba. It is no coincidence that the far right is proposing to change the Cuban Adjustment Act to limit the newcomers’ impact on Miami’s political life.
However, in my opinion, the fundamental change in the composition of the Cuban-American community – something that, short-range, augurs relevant changes in its structure and cultural and political manifestations – does not lie in the new émigrés but in endogenous factors expressed by the fact that about half of the members of that community have been born in the United States.
Unlike the new émigrés, who generally are still going through the long process of integration into U.S. society and therefore are the least favored, economically speaking, and wield the least influence in local politics, those people born in the United States constitute the most dynamic group in the Cuban-American community.
The age breakdown of the second and third generation of Cuban immigrants ranges from the newborn to people in their 50s. This group, therefore, is relatively young, in full development and tends to make its mark in the immediate future of the Cuban-American community. It can transform many of the patterns that still characterize it.
Forty-one percent of working-age Cuban descendants hold jobs in the high range of the labor market and only 12 percent live below the poverty level, which makes them the most favored group in the social scale of the ensemble. In addition, all are U.S. citizens, compared with only 25 percent of the new émigrés, which means that they constitute a majority of the potential voters or are about to be.
The emergence of new Cuban-American politicians also reflects the growing role of this generation in the local political life, even though they are still not representative of new political attitudes but followers of the traditions that have characterized their elders. The reason for this is that they have risen through the traditional political machines, which are linked to the more conservative sectors of the nation.
Therefore, it is not possible to say that the impact of these generations will imply an automatic shift toward the left. The fact is that most of them are direct descendants of the “historic exile” and this influence has marked their lives in many ways. They are aware of political dynamics that, based on the confrontation with Cuba, have benefited them. They are aware of the neoconservative currents that have influenced U.S. society and are aware of Miami’s special relationship with Latin America’s oligarchies and the transnational U.S. companies that operate in the region.
However, there are indicators that show a certain distancing from the positions held by their parents and grandparents, because they’re the only segment of the Cuban-American community that is mostly Democratic, an indicator that does not apply to the new émigrés. In 2008, Obama garnered 35 percent of the Cuban-American vote, and that was due in part to the fact that he got the vote of 65 percent of Cuban-Americans between the ages of 18 and 19, most of whom likely were born in the U.S.
While the difference between Republicans and Democrats has lost relevance in much of U.S. society, such is not the case in the Cuban-American community. There it sets, to a great degree, the political borders, inasmuch as the far-right machine has been built around the Republican affiliation. This constitutes an aspect that differentiates Cuban-Americans from other Latin Americans and is a symbolic expression of their reluctance to improve relations and contacts with Cuba, an aspect that also reveals marked differences.
In 2011, the Cuban Research Institute (CRI) published the results of a much-talked-about survey about the political attitudes of the Cuban-American community. Seventy-one percent of those born in the U.S. favored reestablishing relations with Cuba, a percentage almost identical with those who emigrated after 1994 and much higher than the Cuban-American average (58 percent.)
It is clear that, to this Cuban-American segment, Cuba represents something different from what it has been for the “historic exile” and the “new émigrés.” Nevertheless, several indicators show that there is interest in contacting one’s origins and that relations with the Cuban people can be greater to those we might suppose, although most of them have never visited the island. In fact, it is estimated that 47 percent of them send remittances to their relatives and, according to the CRI survey, 44 percent say they’re ready to invest in Cuba when investments become possible.
Given the number of variables, it is difficult to predict the evolution of this process, but it is evident that we are witnessing a new historic situation, inasmuch as Cuban society has gone through a similar evolution and most of its citizens had not been born when the Revolution triumphed.
The new generations will be in charge of determining the future of relations between Cubans and Cuban-Americans and most likely will do so “in their image and likeness.”
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