The anti-Cuban extreme right, Biden and Trump’s shadow
During last year’s election Joe Biden said he would eliminate Trump’s failed Cuba policies. This was later reflected in the Democratic Party platform which stated that this policy change would be “quick” because of the consensus around it, and that it would not generate political costs. Since Biden became president expectations have been created in various sectors around the United States that the administration would favor a bilateral approach similar to that of the so-called Obama era.
At the time many thought that the minute Biden was sworn in he would announce, at the most in a few weeks and at the very least, an easing of measures associated with remittances and travel, as well as allow the Cuban side to access certain goods essential for the fight against COVID-19. The latter, a strictly humanitarian approach, would mark a notable difference from the cruelty with which the Trump Administration applied measures against the Cuban people in the midst of the pandemic. In other words, a clear break with the former’s political framework was anticipated since it was unsustainable with the new president’s posture.
More than 90 days have passed since the inauguration and the Biden administration has not changed the Trump policy, which includes a system of pretexts, executive provisions and the application of more than 200 unilateral coercive measures that have caused a level of profound deterioration of the relationship between the two sides. Therefore, in practical terms, the new Democratic administration has continued a policy that they themselves described as failed and that is not consistent with their priorities on the international stage.
Senior officials in the Biden Administration have consistently stated that their policy toward Cuba is under review and the issue is not a priority. Apparently the government is in no hurry to modify the current state of bilateral ties and in this way is satisfying the interests of a sector in the United States that feeds, lives and enriches itself from hostile policies: the Cuban-American extreme right.
The most visible representatives of this sector, the main architects and promoters of Trump’s policy towards Cuba, have carried out a kind of ‘political crusade’ since Biden took office with the objective of preserving all the anti-Cuban measures adopted and implemented by the prior administration. So far they’ve been successful, which is a sign of their influence.
From day one the extreme right managed to force the Biden administration to deal with a very complex bilateral environment that implied defining its position in relation to five aspects that constitute the fundamental nucleus of the pretexts handled by Trump’s government. These issues, which can be described as ‘polluting,’ have been formulated in the following terms: the human rights situation on the Island; the acoustic “attacks;” the role of Cuba in Venezuela; the role of the military in the Cuban economy; and, more recently, its reincorporation on the list of countries that sponsor terrorism.
During the so-called policy review process that is underway, all these issues are being debated in the different agencies of the current administration. Each issue is being manipulated and amplified by the extreme right, and the Biden administration is obliged to evaluate the political cost of definitively breaking with all of them, with some of them, or recognizing them. The decision arrived at on how to handle each pretext will be vital to create the right environment that allows the process towards resumption of normalization.
Historical evidence has shown that the impact of the sectors that promote confrontation is determined, essentially, by the space and access that the U.S. government allows it, taking into account its domestic and foreign policy interests. In a context of Cuba as a low priority issue, and with little determination to move quickly in the bilateral approach, these groups acquire greater capacity to influence decision-making and impose obstacles as long as the White House allows them.
The position of leadership held in the U.S. Congress by several Cuban-American legislators, such as the cases of Senators Bob Menéndez and Marco Rubio in the influential Foreign Relations and Select Intelligence Committees, constitutes a weighty variable due to their ability to use the Cuba issue as a bargaining tool and garner commitments from the administration. In practice, they are using political blackmail based on the weaknesses that this administration has projected in terms of determination and political will.
Currently there are seven members of the U.S. House and three senators, 10 in all, of Cuban origin who defend the hard line at the federal level. Since the beginning of January, they began to deploy an offensive that has focused on the following axes: demanding that the Biden administration continue the confrontational approach; demanding that any change be subject to concessions from the Cuban side; presenting Cuba as a threat to U.S. and hemispheric national security, as well as promoting legislative initiatives that hinder ties.
One of the most active has been Sen. Marco Rubio, who has directly lobbied senior officials such as National Security Advisor Jake Sullivan and Secretary of State Anthony Blinken. He has also made several pronouncements, has written press articles and systematically promotes actions on social networks stimulating a social outbreak in Cuba. In the case of Senator Menéndez, he has also lobbied high-ranking government officials and has presented various bills and resolutions in the Senate.
In the House of Representatives, the main protagonist has been Congresswoman María Elvira Salazar, who on January 13 introduced an initiative to prevent the exclusion of Cuba from the list of countries that sponsor terrorism until it meets certain conditions. This project was co-sponsored by Mario Díaz-Balart, Nicole Malliotakis, Carlos Giménez and Alexander Mooney. Salazar uses the social networks almost daily to encourage and support actions that destabilize the social order in Cuba, and recently introduced a project, with clear political-electoral purposes, that calls for the Guantánamo Naval Base to provide consular services to Cubans who find themselves in the process of emigrating to the United States for reasons of family reunification.
In the meantime, the anti-Cuban organization Inspire America Foundation continues to articulate the forces of the extreme right in the Cuban-American community. On February 18, it coordinated an event with the purpose of asking President Biden to maintain the hard-line policy and to focus on putting pressure on the Cuban government in the area of human rights. This activity, in which Rubio, Menéndez and other anti-Cuban legislators participated, was conceived as a response to the multiple initiatives presented that are aimed at resuming the so-called “engagement policy,” trying to send a message of mobilization and consensus within this sector.
The ability of the Cuban-American right to influence will be conditioned by the type of relationship that results between the two governments. Looking to the future, if an environment of little determination, limited steps and demands from the U.S. side is configured, the interests of this sector will be considered in the shaping of the policy. A substantial modification in this equation aimed at generating a dynamic that takes advantage of all the opportunities and the potential of a constructive relationship would place them in a very weakened position with practically no options.
It is in Biden’s hands to silence this sector as Obama did. It requires political will, determination, and putting above the hatred promoted by the Cuban-American extreme right all the possibilities presented by a relationship between Cuba and the United States based on common interests. That is a path that was begun not long ago, and with good results.
Therefore, there is no need to start from scratch. All that is needed is the removal of certain obstacles, and the anti-Cuban sector will have no choice but to kick and holler as they did on December 17, 2014. In essence, it is inconsistent for this administration to continue projecting policy towards Cuba under the shadow of Trump.
Translation to English by Progreso Weekly.
