Radial aggression against Cuba: Declassifying the memory
By Jorge Gómez Barata
This is the fourth part of an interview with an anonymous technician that the author published in the Mexican daily Por Esto.
When I asked him how difficult it was to jam TV Martí when its signal first appeared in the Cuban radio-electric spectrum, he answered with a surprising question.
“Would it be hard for you to knock down a five-year-old girl?”
Jorge Gomez Barata: Of course not. But I would never try it. Besides, what’s the point?
“That’s the point. TV signals, as well as children, space ships, women and flowers are fragile. They were not conceived for attacking or assaulting, and of course, neither should we have to defend ourselves from them. If you have the experts and the means for doing it, once you find how and where to do it, jamming a TV signal is a piece of cake.
“Since it was an aggression, the secrecy with which American experts worked prevented us from knowing their maneuvering. Although we could assume that they would work in the VHF band, for at that time those were the only TV sets available in Cuba, and satellite TV was out of the question because it would require a land station in our country, we couldn’t discard the fact that UHF has thirteen channels and we didn’t know which one they would use.”
Barata: Why was that so important?
“In this case, a TV signal would have to be jammed with another signal. A signal is broadcast by a transmitter, which contrary to a receiver, is not built to tune in different channels. Generally, those transmitters are ordered for specific channels. The possibility of building one for each channel was out of the question since day one. We had to find which channel would be used.”
Barata: By guessing?
“No, through research, by reason and betting. Initially we discarded channels 2 and 6, which at the time where the only two used by Cuban TV. It was unlikely that besides broadcasting a hostile signal to Cuba the Americans would attempt to jam local TV. The same could be assumed in respect to the channels used in Florida, but it wasn’t so. That became clear when we learned some characteristics of the antenna. The point is that unlike a tower, a balloon (*) is not static; it can rotate, oscillate, and even rise or fall. In order to avoid going off the air every time the wind blew, the antenna had a stabilizing mechanism that kept it pointed in the same direction, which also prevented it from broadcasting in the opposite direction.
Barata: Come again?
“It’s simple. Cudjoe Key, where the balloon was anchored, is south of Miami and north of Cuba. Given the antenna’s versatility, even if the balloon rotated 180 degrees the antenna would be pointed to Havana. The channels used in Miami had nothing to fear and you could tune in on any of them without any interference from TV Martí.
Barata: How did you learn so many details about the antenna?
“I don’t know. I never asked. A method we used was to study ‘what for’ and ‘who were’ using the remaining eleven channels and keep an eye on business movements, because radio and TV services are bought, sold and leased, some are even quoted in the stock exchange. Those were years of work, studies, debates, experiments and evaluations, putting two and two together, eyes and ears open. No option and no theory was discarded, no matter how improbable it would seem.
Barata: It must have been fascinating work.
“And fun! We had a great time. Unity and cohesion were exemplary. Experts and officials excelled.”
Barata: And you finally were able to determine which would be the channel through which TV Martí would broadcast.
“Like a Swiss watch. It was perfect. The rest was to launch the operation, broadcasting a signal on that channel that would block the aggression, to make good use of the “law of advantage”, and that our signal, for its power and characteristics, would be lethal to TV Martí. The rest is history.
“TV Martí was not seen for even one minute. Some of our experts that were supposed to check programs begged us to shut the jamming in some places so they could do their job. American personnel in Havana were hysterical, going from one place to the other with portable TV sets in the early hours, trying to find a place where they could tune in to TV Martí. They spent many sleepless nights.
Barata: There are two things that I would like to clear up. Sometime later the U.S. used the UHF band, which is wider, and you also were able to jam the signal; and two, I understand that besides these defensive measures, some other more energetic measures, which could be called offensive, were also taken.
“In relation to the former, the principle is basically the same. As to the latter, I already said that we kept an open mind, and that all options were considered. However, there were many teams on the job, each one on its line of work, and except for the officials, nobody knew everything or participated in everything. If other options existed, I never knew about them. It was none of my business. But I admit it could have happened.
Barata: Are you suggesting anything goes?
“Definitely not. That was Reagan’s position, and both the administrations of the Bushes. Where there is morality and a sense of ethics anything does not go. What I suggest is that options that I do not know of could have been considered, but I am certain that they always would have been legitimate and respectful of the law, of the existence of innocent people, and even of certain codes of honor. Without ethics, politics are disgusting.
(*) In order to have more range, the antenna for broadcasting to Cuba was attached to a high rise balloon that was anchored to the ground at Cudjoe Key. (Progreso Weekly’s note)
Jorge Gomez Barata is a Cuban journalist. He lives in Havana.
