Occupational hazards

America’s
neo-colonial Iraq adventure led it into a moral vacuum. Will the
error be repeated in the renewed U.S. Afghan campaign?

By
Joseph Stiglitz                                                                  Read Spanish Version

From
The Guardian

The
Iraq war has been replaced by the declining economy as the most
important issue in America’s presidential election campaign, in
part because Americans have come to believe that the tide has turned
in Iraq: the troop "surge" has supposedly cowed the
insurgents, bringing a decline in violence. The implications are
clear: a show of power wins the day.

It
is precisely this kind of macho reasoning that led America to war in
Iraq in the first place. The war was meant to demonstrate the
strategic power of military might. Instead, the war showed its
limitations. Moreover, the war undermined America’s real source of
power — its moral authority.

Recent
events have reinforced the risks in the Bush administration’s
approach. It was always clear that the timing of America’s departure
from Iraq might not be its choice — unless it wanted to violate
international law once again. Now, Iraq is demanding that American
combat troops leave within 12 months, with all troops out in 2011.

To
be sure, the reduction in violence is welcome, and the surge in
troops may have played some role. Yet the level of violence, were it
taking place anywhere else in the world, would make headlines; only
in Iraq have we become so inured to bloodshed that it is a good day
if only 25 civilians get killed.

And
the role of the troop surge in reducing violence in Iraq is not
clear. Other factors were probably far more important, including
buying off Sunni insurgents so that they fight with the United States
against al-Qaida. But that remains a dangerous strategy. The U.S.
should be working to create a strong, unified government, rather than
strengthening sectarian militias. Now the Iraqi government has
awakened to the dangers, and has begun arresting some of the leaders
whom the American government has been supporting. The prospects of a
stable future look increasingly dim.

That
is the key point: the surge was supposed to provide space for a
political settlement, which would provide the foundations of
long-term stability. That political settlement has not occurred. So,
as with the arguments used to justify the war, and the measures of
its success, the rationale behind surge, too, keeps shifting.

Meanwhile,
the military and economic opportunity costs of this misadventure
become increasingly clear. Even if the U.S. had achieved stability in
Iraq, this would not have assured victory in the "war on
terrorism," let alone success in achieving broader strategic
objectives. Things have not been going well in Afghanistan, to say
the least, and Pakistan looks ever more unstable.

Moreover,
most analysts agree that at least part of the rationale behind
Russia’s invasion of Georgia, reigniting fears of a new Cold War,
was its confidence that, with America’s armed forces pre-occupied
with two failing wars (and badly depleted because of a policy of not
replacing military resources as fast as they are used up), there was
little America could do in response. Russia’s calculations proved
correct.

Even
the largest and richest country in the world has limited resources.
The Iraq war has been financed entirely on credit; and partly because
of that, the U.S. national debt has increased by two-thirds in just
eight years.

But
things keep getting worse: the deficit for 2009 alone is expected to
be more than a half-trillion dollars, excluding the costs of
financial bail-outs and the second stimulus package that almost all
economists now say is urgently needed. The war, and the way it has
been conducted, has reduced America’s room for maneuver, and will
almost surely deepen and prolong the economic downturn.

The
belief that the surge was successful is especially dangerous because
the Afghanistan war is going so poorly. America’s European allies are
tiring of the endless battles and mounting casualties. Most European
leaders are not as practiced in the art of deception as the Bush
administration; they have greater difficulty hiding the numbers from
their citizens. The British, for example, are well aware of the
problems that they repeatedly encountered in their imperial era in
Afghanistan.

America
will, of course, continue to put pressure on its allies, but
democracy has a way of limiting the effectiveness of such pressure.
Popular opposition to the Iraq war made it impossible for Mexico and
Chile to give in to American pressure at the United Nations to
endorse the invasion; the citizens of these countries were proven
right.

But
back in America, the belief that the surge "worked" is now
leading many to argue that more troops are needed in Afghanistan.

True,
the war in Iraq distracted America’s attention from Afghanistan. But
the failures in Iraq are a matter of strategy, not troop strength. It
is time for America, and Europe, to learn the lessons of Iraq — or,
rather, relearn the lessons of virtually every country that tries to
occupy another and determine its future.

Joseph
Stiglitz is professor of economics at Columbia University. His most
recent book, co-authored with Linda Bilmes, is The
Three Trillion Dollar War: The True Costs of the Iraq Conflict. He
was the recipient of the 2001 Nobel Prize in economics.

http://www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/2008/sep/11/iraq.afghanistan