John McCain doesn
By
Peter McKenna Read Spanish Version
Taken
from The Chronicle Herald Letters.
It
looks like the U.S. presidential contest in November could very well
revolve around issues of foreign policy – including the thorny
"Cuban problem."
Given
the importance of Cuban-Americans in Florida during the 2000
campaign, and the increasing number of Hispanic voters in general,
the electoral significance of Cuba should not be dismissed lightly.
Comparatively
speaking, Republican John McCain and Democrat Barack Obama could not
be more different than when it comes to the controversial issue of
U.S.-Cuba relations.
Among
other things, Obama has called for the removal of restrictions on
travel by Cuban-Americans and on money transfers to the island. More
significant, he maintains that "bilateral talks would be the
best means of promoting Cuban freedom."
John
McCain recently mocked Obama’s position on Cuba, dismissing
outright any idea of breaking bread with Raul Castro. He then went on
to say: "These steps would send the worst possible signal to
Cuba’s dictators – there is no need to undertake fundamental
reforms, they can simply wait for a unilateral change in U.S.
policy."
Shortly
thereafter, Obama responded to McCain’s criticism in an interview
with the Miami Herald and reiterated his willingness to speak
directly with the Cuban government. "Now, I know that John
McCain likes to characterize this as me immediately having Raul
Castro over for tea. What I’ve said is that we would set a series
of meetings with low-level diplomats, set up some preparation, but
that over time I would be willing to meet and talk very directly
about what we expect from the Cuban regime," he explained.
But
if he were elected U.S. president, what exactly would John McCain’s
Cuba policy look like? Moreover, would it serve to foster meaningful
change in revolutionary Cuba?
For
the most part, McCain would make no substantive changes to
Washington’s existing policy of hostility and isolation toward
Havana. In other words, not one thing would change under a McCain
administration unless significant political reforms (including free
elections) took place in Cuba first.
Speaking
to a Miami audience on May 20, Cuba’s Independence Day, McCain
stated unequivocally: "My administration will press the Cuban
regime to release all political prisoners unconditionally, to
legalize all political parties, labour unions, and free media, and to
schedule internationally monitored elections. The embargo must stay
in place until these basic elements of democratic society are met."
As
if to defy the rest of the world and to dismiss what Cubans
themselves want, McCain went on to add: "While our Cuba policy
will not always be in accord with that of our hemispheric and
European partners, my administration will begin an active dialogue
with them to develop a plan for a post-Castro Cuba, a plan that will
spark rapid change and a new awakening in that country."
Like
the George Bush White House, it is essentially a stay-the-course Cuba
policy of confrontation, of imposing conditions on the Cuban
government, and of eschewing any dialogue with Havana. Furthermore,
he has absolutely no intention of rescinding the five decades-long
U.S. economic embargo against Cuba (even though he led the push to
remove the embargo against Vietnam in the 1990s) or the controversial
Helms-Burton law (which seeks to penalize Canadians for doing
business in Cuba).
Additionally,
there would be no change to the regulations governing the visits of
Cuban-Americans to the island (once every three years), the
restrictions on the amount of remittances that could be sent to
relatives in Cuba ($1,200 annually), the numbers of Cubans who are
permitted to enter the U.S. legally (a set quota of 20,000), or its
"wet foot/dry foot" policy toward accepting "illegal"
Cuban migrants.
It
amounts to more of an abdication of policy-making responsibility,
leaving it in the hands of mostly implacable Cuban exiles in Miami.
Simply put, it is a recipe for more of the same old, shop-worn mantra
that talking tough to the Cubans will eventually bring them around.
It
might very well prove to be politically expedient, but it doesn’t
make for intelligent foreign policy. Clearly, 50 years of a U.S.-Cuba
stalemate has exposed the fatal flaws of such a Cold War policy
posture.
As
Obama pointed out: "I know what the easy thing is to do for
American politicians. Every four years, they come down to Miami, they
talk tough, they go back to Washington and nothing changes in Cuba."
Indeed,
it is a failed strategy that has done precious little to advance
economic and political reforms in Cuba. More than anything, it has
served to fortify the Cuban government, to strengthen the hand of
hard-liners in Havana, and to galvanize the people around their
political leadership.
Each
candidate’s Cuba policy is certain to enter into the campaign not
only in Florida, but wherever the two leaders debate issues of U.S.
foreign policy. But if the sophistication of their positions on Cuba
is any indication of how well they will do in November, it won’t be
a good campaign for the McCain team.
Peter
McKenna is an associate professor in the department of political
studies at the University of Prince Edward Island and the co-author
of the forthcoming book, Fighting
Words: Competing Voices Over the Cuban Revolution.
