A conversation: The Venezuela referendum
From
Havana Read Spanish Version
Orestes
Martí and Manuel Alberto Ramy
A
conversation: The Venezuela referendum
Orestes
Martí:
The echoes of the results of the Venezuela referendum are still
ringing. Thousands of pages of commentary by international politics
analysts are published daily. Thousands of pages about the topic fill
the Internet.
Beyond
the bias of some reports, which carry "noise" and "gaps,"
are the objective data: the valid votes numbered 8,883,746; the void
ballots, 118,693; and the total tallied, 9,002,439. Abstention
totaled 44.9 percent.
The "No"
accounted for 50.7 percent of the votes; the "Yes," 49.29
percent. (The rightist vote was slightly higher — just over 5
percent — than during the previous presidential election. Three
million people who voted for Chávez in previous elections did
not support the referendum. Out of those 3 million votes, only
300,000 went to the right.)
In Bloc
A, which contained the articles submitted by the president, the "No"
accounted for 4,504,354 votes. The "Yes" garnered 4,379,392
votes.
In Bloc
B, whose articles were contained in the second question in the
referendum, the "No" accounted for 4,522,331 votes (51.05
percent), against 4,335,136 for the "Yes" (48.94 percent.)
The
"Yes" option overcame the "No" in 15 of the 24
Venezuelan states. Beyond those results, reported by the National
Electoral Council of Venezuela are other elements, which cannot be
ignored when the results are evaluated. For example:
• The
United States invested more than $20 million in its campaign against
the referendum.
• Ninety
percent of Venezuela’s printed media favored the "No" and
on occasion acted with total disregard for ethics. The "Yes"
movement had no printed media on its side.
• Television
(also in the hands of the right) carried out a fear campaign. The two
channels in favor of the "Yes" have no programming that
appeals to the population.
• All
that media propaganda (with dire warnings about the loss of parental
rights, private property, etc.) was supported by the Catholic Church
and repeated in parishes and ecclesiastical institutions. The "Yes"
bloc did not provide adequate counter-propaganda.
• An
acceleration of the flight of capital and a shortage of basic foods
created some popular discontent. The Government has not been able to
solve that situation.
• The
countereffective actions of some sectors in the far left and "former
leftists" at times seemed like rightist propaganda.
• President
Chávez devoted perhaps an excessive amount of time to topics
of an international nature, instead of domestic-policy
considerations.
At this
point, I would like to widen the scope of analysis on the possible
consequences of the results of this referendum. To do this, I welcome
Manuel Alberto Ramy, Havana bureau chief of Radio Progreso
Alternativa and editor of Progreso Semanal, the Spanish-language
version of Progreso Weekly.
Marti:
My dear friend Ramy, I know that you have been following closely the
process of the referendum held in Venezuela and I would like you to
give our readers your opinion on three specific issues. How do you
evaluate the referendum, in terms of the information you already
have?
Manuel
Alberto Ramy: At the
beginning, you gave data that are important, but what’s essential —
in my opinion — is what lies beneath, what the data express. First,
we must distinguish between Project and Process.
The
victory of the "No," which is certainly pyrrhic, is a
stumble in the process of
change, not in the project
of change. It was due to an
error in timing. For some reason I do not know, the management of the
Venezuelan process moved the clock ahead and, in so doing, impaired
the quality of the process.
Moving
the clock ahead also did not give enough time to a task of
politization, to explain to the people the 69 articles submitted to a
referendum — which were, of course, too many. To this indispensable
task, the managers allotted 45 days, at most. And the political
grassroots did not participate in the discussion and selection of
issues to be set forth. Those issues were decided at the top.
Marti:
When you say a leap of quality in the process, you’re thinking that
society was not sufficiently prepared.
Ramy:
I cannot be categorical
regarding the process’ lack of matureness in society as a whole. The
matureness in social processes of any type of ideology does not
travel in a linear fashion. But the fact that 49.29 percent supported
the "Yes," which means it supported the project, is
eloquent.
However,
we must wonder about the 3 million who abstained and who, on 10
previous occasions, voted for the process. Who stopped them? A
skillful handling by the opposition and the media, who turned those
45 days in months of media distortion of some of the most sensitive
topics.
Remember
that, according to some commentators, the Bush administration, in
roundabout ways, spent $20 million to finance the opposition. The
opposition focused on the articles that — by means of good
communication techniques — could discourage a response. The
opposition did not need to attract those voters, merely to inhibit
them. That was their game.
And that
was not dealt with efficiently by the progressive forces, which had
to promote a model of socialism and were hampered, in terms of
political and electoral apparatuses. Besides, they had to explain in
detail a referendum that had too many articles, some of which can be
passed by Congress as laws, such as the reduced work day and the
insurance or subsidies for street vendors and housewives.
Martí:
Why do you say
hampered?
Ramy:
The Movement of the Fifth
Republic, which was the agglutinating front, dissolved some months
ago to become the backbone of the PSUV [United Socialist Party of
Venezuela], which is still not organized and has not been joined by
other movements or parties, for various reasons. The referendum was
launched without a solid structure and the Comando for the "Yes"
carried the old differences and practiced a vertical relation with
the bases.
Add to
that the fact that, within the political apparatus, certain "barons
of socialism" have emerged, whose interests are contradictory to
the project, because, if the proposals succeed, they would lose power
and control. The option of "Yes" entered the race with a
car that was missing at least two wheels and a steering mechanism
with more good intentions than strategy.
There is
one additional point: the government and Chávez himself
simultaneously opened too many combat fronts, both domestic and
foreign. However, let me talk again about time: an insufficient
matureness, too much haste in summoning the referendum, the lack of a
dissemination effort and the absence of good communications. I
insist, however, that, with almost 50 percent of the votes going to
the "Yes," this triumph of the "No" can be
reversed if the revolutionaries learn their lesson and counterattack.
OM:
How can the failure be reverted?
Ramy:
You’re carrying me to the
edge of boldness, but with the existing Constitution the government
can carry out many of the objectives of the referendum, by enabling
projects, programs and key sectors of the economy. It is not a
question of remaining on that field but of using it as a trampoline.
Perhaps — and this is a question of strategy — the government
should have started from there and could have finished later, with a
less-voluminous referendum.
It is
realities that create or accelerate conscience, or don’t.
Contradictions, triumphs and defeats are all part of the social
dynamics. If by 2013, when Chávez’s term ends, he could show
examples that socialization is effective for a good number of
citizens, the process could recover the 3 million votes it lost, and
gain some more, too. But, I insist, the marrow of the issue is not
inside the ballot boxes; it just passes through them.
Martí:
What do you think
about the statements made by Mr. George Bush about the triumph of the
"No"?
Ramy:
Can someone who heads a
plutocratic system talk about democracy? In 2000, Al Gore won the
presidency by more than 200,000 votes; yet, the Supreme Court,
inherited from the father, determined that the Dauphin had won. Let
us apply the case to Venezuela on Dec. 2 and let’s imagine that the
difference was less than recorded and that it became necessary to
turn the election to a competent tribunal. Let’s imagine that the
tribunal determined that Chávez won. The outcry would have
been deafening and stained with blood. By accepting his defeat, the
Bolivarian leader denied that he is a dictator and made the
opposition abide by the Constitution of the Fifth Republic.
Martí:
What implications
might the results of the referendum have for Cuba?
Ramy:
Venezuela and Cuba are two
different processes, for reasons of origin, development and context.
The essential link is the promotion of a society with more human
values and a more equitable distribution of wealth. Both governments
share a geostrategic vision. I perceive that the motive for your
question is related to the special moment Cuba is going through. Will
it put the brakes on the necessary changes? Will it moderate them?
Cuba’s
problems are unique and they inevitably must be confronted. What
happened in Venezuela — which is not definitive — could strengthen
the arguments of inmoveable sectors, but can also invigorate those
who aspire to a process of reforms that leads to a new model or
practice of socialism.
For
example, the problems in the agricultural sector are ours alone. The
country cannot continue to import 70 or 80 percent of the Cubans’
foodstuffs, particularly in the event of a hypothetical adverse
situation — which would certainly not catch the country’s leaders
unaware.
The
structural changes that Raúl Castro talked about point in this
direction. It is basically a question of energize the economy and
even — as he himself has said — to open up to new investments that
have been carefully analyzed and are made under clear contracts. To
postpone the reforms is to play with suicide, with a divorcement from
reality.
I also
don’t believe our government is putting the brakes on the needed
changes. The reforms (which are "nothing spectacular," in
Raúl’s words) will come from the new Assembly of the People’s
Power and will likely be discussed by the Assembly. Why? Very simple,
and I repeat what I’ve been writing for months: There is a dual
process, a current of reforms and a current of an inevitable
generational transit. The guarantee of a generational turnover rests
on the institutions.
Orestes
Martí, a Cuban-Spanish writer who specializes on Information
and Communication, is a regular contributor to Canarias Insurgente.
Note:
On Dec. 8, the National
Electoral Council issued the final results: In Bloc A, the "No"
option won 4,521,494 votes (50.65 percent). The "Yes"
option won 4,404,626 votes (49.34 percent). Abstention was 43.95
percent.
In Bloc
B, the "No" option won 4,539,707 votes (51 percent.) The
"Yes" option won 4,360,014 votes (48.99 percent).
Abstention
was 43.85 percent.
