The Pope’s visit and the complex exercise of dialoguing

By Jesús Arboleya Cervera

HAVANA – Fidel Castro’s presence at the Vatican in the 1990s and John Paul II’s visit to Cuba in January 1998 were landmarks in Cuba’s recent history. At least for my generation, raised during a conflict that even involved God, no matter whose side one was on, to understand the event means to overcome experiences that marked our lives.
To the Cuban revolutionaries – even acknowledging the Church’s contributions to Cuban culture – those events meant engaging with an institution that was accused of being one of the pillars of the Spanish colonial state and U.S. neocolonialism, as well as one of the cohesive forces for the counterrevolutionary movement, at a time when violence from both sides excluded any form of dialogue.

In addition, John Paul II was recognized (maybe in an overestimation of his earthly powers) as one of the men who, along with Ronald Reagan, had managed to end socialism in Europe. He was considered to be a retrograde force within his own Church, given the distance he kept from the guidelines established during Vatican Council II and his pressure against the revolution theologians in Latin America.

I remember that even left-wing Catholics, the few that remained in Cuba then, opposed the visit. A friend told me: “I’ll go see the Pope on the plaza [Revolution Square] only if the Committees for the Defense of the Revolution take me.” That’s exactly what happened.

The enemies of the Revolution, for their part, conceived these encounters as a betrayal of their principles. They found it incredible and almost obscene that the Holy Father would shake hands with “the dictator” in the sacred halls of the Vatican and, to make matters worse, said Mass on Revolution Square, a place that symbolized the most radical moments of the revolutionary process.

Indeed, many were persecuted or discriminated against because of their affiliation with the Catholic Church. Dozens of young Catholics died defending the ideals set forth by that institution. Abroad, the Church had sheltered emigrants and distinguished itself by supporting the most recalcitrant positions. As a result of this, émigrés in the U.S. boycotted a pilgrimage to Cuba organized by the Archdiocese of Miami and berated the Cuban Church in the worst possible language.

Beyond historical factors, ideological interests and inclinations and specific political situations, I have come to the conclusion that one of the reasons for the intransigence of Cuban political actors facing the possibility of dialogue has been the relative asymmetry of the adversaries, which has forestalled a debate under conditions of equality.

The confrontation with the United States defines Cuba’s political process and alters the domestic equation. Without the ability to modify U.S. policy, its rights ignored by the Americans, the Revolution’s attitude has been not to offer any openings to the enemy.
Into that bag have fallen many options that might suggest softness and therefore be suspicious. The space for a national debate has been reduced, often to excess, in a way that has been counterproductive.

The Cuban Revolution has been characterized by a political activism on an international scale that kept it from being cloistered, as happened in other socialist countries. It has also been noted for its initiatives to thwart U.S. actions and its power to mobilize the people at the most difficult moments. Therefore, its siege mentality generated in many an attitude of reluctance to debate and renew.

Therein, at least in part, lies the ideology that distinguishes the existence of a sector opposed to the dialogue and, in my opinion, the essence of the need for a change in “mindset” advocated by Raúl Castro to make progress in that sense.

The Cuban counterrevolution, for its part, also has been a hostage to its asymmetry vis-à-vis the revolutionary power, and that explains the conservative tinge that predominates in its positions. Incapable of defeating the Revolution and alienated from the domestic stage, the counterrevolution became an appendix of U.S. policy, so its existence has depended from maintaining a state of belligerence between the two nations, barring dialogue as a political alternative.

Those who, in Cuba and outside, now advocate a national dialogue cannot overlook these conditions, given that U.S. hostility is an unchanged variable. John Paul II’s visit had no favorable implications in U.S. policy toward Cuba; on the contrary, it was followed by eight years of much aggressiveness by the Bush administration and most of its budgets remain in force. The question is whether, despite all that, a dialogue between Cubans is possible.

At least the positive answer has been demonstrated by the dialogue between the Cuban state and the Catholic Church. It will continue with the forthcoming visit by Benedict XVI, now within a different political climate, as a result of the changes that have occurred in the Cuban society and the émigré community.

To the chagrin of Cuban-American far-rightists, the conditions for new Miami boycotts no longer exist, which indicates an appreciable modification in the correlation of forces that exist among émigrés and the growing emergence of sectors that favor dialogue, which have found in the local Catholic Church an interlocutor for their positions.

I believe that this time few Cuban revolutionaries will feel offended by the Pope’s presence in Cuba, even if his ideological positions do not significantly differ from his predecessor’s and even if the dialogue with the Catholics extends to other sectors of the population, increasing the weight of the institution in the national debate.

Even more importantly, because “national reconciliation” is an objective recognized by both parties and because the defense of Cuba’s sovereignty has been reaffirmed as a basic ingredient of the dialogue being proposed (which implies considering U.S. hostility), the logic of both parties’ actions must coincide, thus increasing mutual trust.

It would be too much to ask the Supreme Pontiff to help change U.S. policy toward Cuba, but the symbolism of his presence, his talks with the Cuban authorities and his contact with a nation where Catholicism is not the only denomination represented could help us Cubans to continue to understand each other, overcoming the obstacles from the past. Herein lies the strategic importance of the Pope’s voyage to the island.

Progreso Semanal/Weekly authorizes the total or partial reproduction of the articles written by our journalists, so long as the source and author are identified.