Roger (Cohen) and me
By
Saul Landau Read Spanish Version
As
the prosperous, ethical and super-duper powerful United States
erodes, The
New York Times Magazine
editors decided to feature, on its December 2 cover, the demise of
Cuba’s socialist society.
“The
End of the Revolution” appeared as reports emerged of a single
schnorrer (Bernard Madoff) gouging 50 billion dollars from the
smartest investors on Wall St. Foreclosures continue to force
millions out of their homes, unemployment rates rose each month and
the country’s infrastructure rots and cracks. The tell tale signs
of the end of “the American Century” appeared throughout the
world: two un-winnable wars; getting
excluded
from a major summit meeting of Latin America and Caribbean leaders in
Brazil; an economy sapped by military spending unrelated to even the
most remote needs of defense. In this setting, the nation’s most
prestigious newspaper sent reporter Roger Cohen to analyze the
crumbling physical and moral structure of Cuban society.
Despite
potential feature stories throughout the United States about
spectacular collapse of cities and regions larger and more populous
than Cuba, the “liberal” U.S. media continues to take particular
pleasure in describing how the dreams of the Cuban revolution have
faded into the grey and depressing reality of decay evident
throughout the island. Cohen describes accurately some of the apathy
and cynicism that foreigners can easily find in conversation with
“typical” Cubans on the street. What has any of this got to do
with the “end” of the Cuban Revolution?
Cohen
bathes in his own sensitivity as he empathizes with nostalgic and
deprived Cubans; but for the purpose of undermining any alternate
vision of a good society. He dramatizes the dysfunctional aspects of
Cuba’s economy — obvious to any observer. But Cuba’s failings
pale in comparison to what the U.S. public now experiences, thanks in
part to the myths spread by free market liberals and newspapers like
the Times. The implicit measure of his judgment seems to be based on
some healthy model, presumably one still operating somewhere in the
noble core of the United States or some third world country.
Cohen’s
assumption that the United States “sometimes” acts in manners
that tarnish its basic nature, for example, permeates the piece. In
so doing, he effectively denies its basic imperial nature. Cohen
looks at the U.S. Guantanamo Naval Base, which “had become
synonymous with some of the most egregious acts of Bush’s war on
terror, acts that have tarnished America’s name.” Did he forget 4
million dead Vietnamese, Agent Orange that poisoned that land,
hundreds of thousands of dead Iraqis?
“There
have been other moments of American dishonor over the years in Latin
America,” Cohen admits, “from Chile to Argentina, where “the
U.S. told generals it would look the other way.” Did he also mean
by “moments” the 20 year occupation of Haiti and Nicaragua, the
invasions of Cuba, Panama, Honduras and the Dominican Republic, the
placement of pro-U.S. governments in Cuba, Haiti and Nicaragua headed
by tyrants — Batista, Duvalier and Somoza? Washington not only told
the generals it would look the other way, it helped the generals
overthrow elected governments in several countries and then offered
them support to torture, disappear and murder their dissenting
citizens (Brazil in 1964, followed by Chile, Argentina and Uruguay in
the next decade). The modern U.S. vision for Latin America has always
contained internal contradictions at best. Kennedy promoted the
glorious Alliance for Progress, to carry Latin America forward
economically and encourage democracy. He also promoted — with a far
larger budget — counterinsurgency for the repressive enemies of
democracy in the military and police. Johnson kept the Peace Corps
going while backing a military coup in Brazil and invading and
occupying the Dominican Republic. Nixon and Kissinger together simply
preferred “authoritarian” governments. From 1970-3, while
covering their “preferences” with the facade of human rights,
they blithely altered the destiny of the Chilean people by ordering
the CIA to “destabilize” the elected Allende government.
Cohen
refers repeatedly to history only to vitiate history itself. Indeed,
the most important line in his essay contradicts his thesis. Elena
Alvarez, an Economics Ministry official, tells him: “The revolution
has been a success.” She included in her definition the achievement
of sovereignty, national pride and surviving “fifty years” of
aggression by “the most powerful country in the world.”
She
could have added that the revolution also allowed Cubans to make
history in southern Africa, save countless lives after natural
disasters around the world, as well as the eyesight of tens of
thousands who had no access to such medical service. The point about
its past success eludes Cohen and most other mainstream writers who
bask in the discontent of Cuba’s shabby present, and then point to
“countless talented Cubans” who sit around “plotting to get
out.” It’s true that a million Cubans have left since 1959 for
the wealthier shores of Florida. Another million, however, fought
alongside Africans for Angola’s independence from 1975-1978.
Cubans played roles in the Vietnam War and served in the 1973 Middle
East war as well. Others climbed mountains in Pakistan to save lives
after the 2005 earthquake; Cuban doctors treat the poor in
sub-Saharan Africa and other places most doctors would not go.
To
present the case against Cuba, history first must suffer severe body
blows. Cohen laments “the fruitless paralysis of the Cuban-American
confrontation.” Note how he reverts to the passive voice to deflect
historical cause and effect. “Diplomatic relations have
been
(my emphasis) severed since 1961; a U.S. trade embargo has
been in
place…” He could have made the article both active and more
accurate by saying “President Eisenhower broke relations in January
1961 and Kennedy formally placed a trade embargo on Cuba in 1962.”
Cohen
lists several factors that work against restoring relations: “bad
history, predatory U.S. practices and the expediency of autocratic
regimes of casting the United States as the diabolical enemy.” By
bad history, did he mean naughty? On whose part?
In
fact, the United States has acted like Cuba’s diabolical enemy. The
very language used to justify the embargo and travel ban emphasizes
“punishing Castro.” The United States instigated thousands of
terrorist attacks against the island, prepared and launched an
invasion at the Bay of Pigs, tried to cut off Cuba from the rest of
the world and possibly engaged in biological and chemical warfare
during certain periods. If that’s not diabolical, what is?
Both
sides have “traded accusations” of terrorism, writes Cohen,
implying mutual responsibility. The record shows, however, the United
States actively practiced assassination and sabotage against Cuba.
Evidence of Cuban aggression against U.S. leaders or installations,
on the other hand, appears non-existent. Cuba could, of course,
metaphorically, stop punching the United States in the fist with its
face.
After
the 1991 Soviet collapse, Cuba drifted with survival measures. This
year, 3 hurricanes destroyed a good percentage of its agriculture and
hundreds of thousands of homes. Its wage-salary structure is rife
with irrationality and aspects of paternal governance inherited from
colonial Spain irritate the highly educated citizenry– as does media
censorship.
Fifty
years of an experiment in socialism with a lethal enemy at its door
has yielded some startling successes: Cuban art and music stun
visitors. Cuban literature, film, dance and sports claim rightfully
high places in the world. Cohen doesn’t return to the era of
Batista, when the Mafia ran hotels and casinos, when the United
States dictated Cuba’s policies. True, fifty years has not produced
an ideal society or a model others would now copy.
How
does one measure a nation’s history, its progress? In
1868,
Cuban patriots initiated the first war for independence from Spain.
Almost 100 years later, Castro led the revolution to realize that
dream.
Cohen
writes of the “terrible price” Cubans have paid for “Fidel’s
communist revolution,” as if he did it by himself. In Cuba, no one
has disappeared and no journalists have been murdered. No single man
could steal $50 billion from others.
Cubans
did pay a price, perhaps most in having divided families. Most of the
wealthy and middle classes left by the early 1960s. The poor face
scarcity, but also receive benefits, like guaranteed medical care,
housing, education and food, albeit not as much as they enjoyed
twenty years ago. But the flaws inherent in revolutionary or
evolutionary processes — think of the U.S. Civil War, the centuries
of slavery and apartheid — should point to the uneven and combined
nature of human development itself. And, like most historical eras,
one major actor, 90 miles away, helped determine the context in which
a less powerful player evolved.
That
Cuba survived 50 years of almost unrelieved punishment by a
superpower neighbor is a modern miracle. I toast to its necessary
reforms in 2009!
Saul
Landau’s films with Fidel are available on DVD from
roundworldproductions.com.
