U.S. policy toward Cuba in 2012

By Jesús Arboleya Cervera

The year 2011 ended with the defeat of an attempt by the Cuban-American far right to limit travel to Cuba. The defeat was due to the reaction of the Cuban-American community to the proposal, the fairly widespread rejection of the American public and the government’s position, stronger than other times, when it announced that the president would veto the budget bill if it included a proposal of this nature.

Faced with the danger that the travel amendment would prevent the passage of a law of capital importance for the country, the Republican leadership decided to eliminate it and, as a consolation prize, removed an opposing proposal to facilitate trade with Cuba.

On the Democratic side, although the legislators voted overwhelmingly in favor of the amendment reducing travel to Cuba, their colleagues in the Senate pushed for excluding it, so it is easy to conclude that it was a dispute that crossed party affiliations, reflecting the complexity of the Cuban issue for U.S. policy.

We should therefore analyze this balance of forces and the trends involved in it and thus have an idea of what can happen in the year just begun.

It has been shown that the Cuban-American vote is not decisive to win the state of Florida, not even Miami-Dade County, and even the cohesion of that electorate around the right-wing agenda is becoming increasingly fragile. And the contributions of the Cuban-American lobby, welcome though they may be, do not determine the future of American politicians.

Therefore, viewed historically, the strength of the Cuban-American extreme right has not resided in its real power, but in enhancing the current policy, particularly during the administrations of Ronald Reagan and George W. Bush; in its link with other American political sectors and, for a time, in the absence of adversaries interested in a change of policy toward Cuba.

The Obama administration changed the budget bill, since, despite its limitations and inconsistencies, its policy towards Cuba clashes with the basic interests of the Cuban-American right wing and ranks among his most ardent opponents. Then there is the influence of ideological reasons and domestic political interests that have traditionally brought these groups closer to the more conservative sectors of the Republican Party, particularly those that advocate a very aggressive policy toward Latin America.

To these Republican sectors, the Cuban-American right wing contributes its control of local politics in South Florida, links to the Latin American oligarchy and an intense political activism around the Cuban issue, which is expressed primarily in election campaigns and the functioning of Congress.

Perhaps one of the most significant weaknesses in Obama’s policy, regarding not only the case of Cuba but also its own domestic interests, has been not to confront with more determination the Cuban-American political machine, which, paradoxically, to a large extent feeds on government contributions to the plans against Cuba. Therefore, every dollar given to them is a rope for its own neck.

One reason that could explain this contradiction is that forces against Cuba also move among the Democrats, who benefit from the Cuban-American right wing to advance their own policies, as in the case of the important Jewish lobby.

It is clear that when we speak of the Jewish lobby we are not talking about the entire Jewish community, although much of it is acting under the influence of this powerful machine, whose nationwide influence ranges from liberal to neo-conservatives.

Cuba is not the Jewish lobby’s main priority, but the Cuban government’s conflict with Israel has caused the hostility of Zionist politics worldwide toward the island. Proof of this is that, along with the United States, Israel is the only country that consistently votes against the condemnations of the blockade passed by the UN.

The interests of the Cuban-American right wing tie in perfectly with this policy, which also has ramifications in the state of Florida, where the Jewish electorate is one of the largest in the country. Politicians like Ileana Ros-Lehtinen have built their careers on this alliance and the Cuban American National Foundation itself was created with the direct advice of the Jewish lobby, which found in these groups a cheap way to extend the range of its political action on the Cuban case.

This picture allows us to understand the forces that oppose a change in policy toward Cuba. However, contrary to what happened a few years ago when there were few counterparts to the Cuban-American right wing, other significant forces now push in the opposite direction.

For years, the lobby that favors policy change and the expansion of economic relations with Cuba has concentrated not only on the left or the more liberal sectors of the Democratic Party, but also on economic groups with a strong conservative Republican affiliation, such as the food industry, which is particularly interested in trade with the island.

During the W. Bush administration, the influence of this trend was limited by the threat of the presidential veto, affecting an alliance that could impact on other interests, such as the farm subsidies, agriculture’s top priority in its relations with the government. With the rise of Barack Obama, the veto threat disappeared, enhancing the activity of this group with respect to the Cuban case. The same can be said about other interests, particularly the oil sector, given the expectations raised by oil exploration in Cuba.

Some analysts maintain that Cuba is not a priority of American policy and this determines its inertia. But the cause could be the opposite, since the Cuban problem actually goes through multiple coordinates of the political life of the U.S. The subject surfaces when dealing with many different issues. The most important groups in national policy are interested in it and – from the blockade to the immigration policy – exceptional treatment is given to the Cuban case, whose effectiveness is in doubt.

It is true that most of the power groups involved so far in this debate, whatever their sign, would prefer radical changes in Cuba and would like to see the island brought again into the American orbit. But encouraging such an outcome is an existential precondition only for the Cuban-American far right. Therein lies both the exceptional nature of its case, and the possibility of imposing, at some point, the trend that favors forms of coexistence that modify the current policy.

Perhaps the year 2012, again because of the elections, will not be the right time for change and the inertia will persist. The result will be that U.S. policy toward Cuba will continue to age and not fulfill the desires of many for the new year.

Progreso Semanal/Weekly authorizes the reproduction of all or part of the articles by our journalists as long as the source and author are identified.