Rafters: The return trip

By Jesús Arboleya Cervera

Among the comments made about my recent articles in Progreso Weekly, one that caught my attention – because it did not refer to the article’s content – was that of a Cuban rafter who complained of the disregard shown to people like him in Cuba and the United States and mentioned the regulations that prevent him from traveling to Cuba.

Although it is not exactly disregard – because many academics and journalists from both countries, myself included, have referred to the issue – it is fair to delve deeply into the situation of these people, the conflicts generated by the treatment they have received in both countries, and the prospects of solving a problem as serious and complicated as the illegal migration from Cuba.

I investigated and learned that the prohibition of visiting Cuba does not refer to the more than thirty thousand people who left the country in August 1994, resulting in what became known as the “rafters crisis,” but to those who left it illegally after the signing of the Migratory Agreements on Sept. 9 of that year.

I estimate that universe to encompass no more than 10,000 people who emigrated illegally at various times in the past 15 years. The prohibition reflects the commitment of the Cuban side, contained in the agreements, to discourage illegal migration without using violence against those who try.

Apparently, the main problem for those who fled in the August 1994 surge is that, given the anarchical nature of the flow, in Cuba there was no precise control over the date when they migrated, which lends itself to all kinds of confusion.

Obviously, this is a situation that needs to be reviewed, and several migrant organizations and travel agencies have voiced their opinions in this regard. They know of the Cuban government’s willingness to act as it does, but the problem is not that simple because it is not just a bureaucratic issue.

The illegal immigration issue is particularly sensitive to both governments, especially to the Cuban side, not only because of the social instability it generates, the humanitarian problems it implies and the danger posed by access to the coast of people smugglers (usually also linked to drug traffickers and potential terrorists), but because any decision that is interpreted as an encouragement to illegal migration could be an excuse for armed attacks by the United States.

This is not an unfounded assumption. Military intervention was an option in all the previous crises, say the Mariel boat lift or the rafter exodus of 1994, and as recently as earlier this month. In an article by Saul Landau and Nelson P. Valdés published in Progreso Weekly (“Leaked Cuba memo to raise eyebrows”), we learned that certain sectors of power in the United States consider armed force inevitable in the event of further massive illegal migration from Cuba.

What’s paradoxical about this situation is that, once they step on U.S. soil, these people are not considered illegal immigrants by the United States, but refugees. This allows them to benefit from the Cuban Adjustment Act, which was designed exclusively for illegal immigrants, since those who enter the U.S. legally do not require it.

So there is a contradiction:  while that country denies illegals a visa for considering them ineligible according to U.S. immigration law, it pressures Cuba to keep them from leaving, to the point of threatening war. The U.S. repatriates them when they are caught at sea but gives them special treatment if they arrive, waiving the very obstacles that its own government has created for them.

That situation increases dramatically the dangers of illegal migration from Cuba. It is a myth that, “fleeing from communism,” people used to come in rustic rafts to U.S. shores. The truth is that almost nobody gets through the Straits of Florida on a wooden board.

What happened before 1994 is that illegal migrants enjoyed the guarantee of being picked up as soon as they left Cuban territorial waters. Now, they have to navigate all the way, evading one of the world’s most sophisticated maritime surveillance systems. That’s very dangerous, even in the better-equipped vessels used by traffickers.

The other alternative is to travel by sea to Mexico or Central America (also a dangerous journey), and enter the United States through a land border. This adds more conflict to the relations between Cuba and the United States to these countries, serves to create new channels and networks of smugglers, and contradicts U.S. policy, which is designed to restrict illegal immigration at all costs, considering it a threat to national security.

It is clear that Cuba, no matter what the U.S. decisions are, has to fully review its immigration policy to adapt it to the current domestic circumstances. But I don’t think it will do so to encourage illegal emigration, a phenomenon that rips apart social relations, distorts international relations, and puts people in the worst possible human and political situations.

I think that – although circumstantial solutions can be found to improve the situation – the problem of illegal Cuban emigrants unfortunately will not have a definitive solution as long as the United States does not take a consistent position and stops using it with a subversive approach, thinking that can encourage it at low cost and placing the Cuban government in the unusual position of serving as guardian of the United States’ border.