Obama’s limits in Honduras

By Jesús Arboleya Cervera

The ambiguity of U.S. policy in the case of Honduras, along with the installation of seven military bases in Colombia, have not only caught off-guard some Latin American governments that were betting on the “new beginning” in hemispheric relations announced by Barack Obama at the Summit of the Americas but also have cast doubt on the sincerity of his discourse and his ability to put it to practice.

While Obama insists that his government supports the unconditional restitution of President Manuel Zelaya, his Secretary of State avoids defining Zelaya’s removal as a military coup d’état – which would call for an appeal to the Democratic Charter of the O.A.S. – and proposes a “solution that is negotiated between the parties.” This has become known as the San José Plan.

On the other hand, nobody has talked about suspending military cooperation between the two countries and, while the U.S. announces the withdrawal of economic aid to the de-facto government, the I.M.F. grants Honduras a credit line of $150 million. The statement that “we don’t negotiate with or make concessions to kidnappers,” so often uttered in American movies, apparently is not valid for Honduras.

While the putschists decreed a state of siege, destroyed the press media, assaulted and arrested those who support the president – the toll for three months of repression is estimated to be 17 people dead and 4,000 arrested – and shamelessly expelled from the country the same O.A.S. officials who tried to discuss the “negotiated solution” favored by the United States, the U.S. representative at the O.A.S. practically blamed Zelaya for the incidents and accused him of staging show-business poses. Clearly, the official felt that the president should have shown some humility and remained in his pajamas in Costa Rica until someone told him when to return to his homeland.

Finally, an O.A.S. commission was able to enter the country and organize a dialogue between the parties that, so far, points to a not-very-promising resolution.

Beyond the anecdotes, let us analyze what, in fact, is being debated in Honduras.

Despite accusations that he is a “Chavista,” Zelaya is not really a popular leader. At least, he did not come to power through a popular movement. Until recently, his political base was not in the poorest sectors of the Honduran populations. Some reformist measures and an unusual sensitivity to social problems – compared with the traditional behavior of Honduran politicians – have characterized his administration.

The scion of a family of agricultural landowners, Zelaya arrived at the presidency as a candidate for the Liberal Party, which for years has shared power with other forces of the oligarchy and the military. Not coincidentally, the putschist Roberto Micheletti, who for the past 28 years has been a deputy and frequent presidential candidate, is a member of that party.

Besides, it is not an ordinary oligarchy but a small group of people who control 90 percent of the country’s riches and whose political behavior is considered to be one of the most brutal in the region. The results are clear for all to see. Enough to say that in Honduras 63 percent of the people are malnourished and that Honduras is the third-poorest country in Latin America. Add to that its high levels of organized crime, where juvenile gangs, paramilitary groups and drug-trafficking cartels number in the hundreds.

Although traditionally the oligarchies catered to the installation and operation of foreign powers (particularly the role of the U.S. in Central America), after John F. Kennedy designed the Alliance for Progress it became clear that a sector of the so-called U.S. “establishment” understood that those oligarchies had become an impediment to the reforms demanded by new U.S. investments, which were intended to improve life, such as easing the social pressures that existed in the region.

Apparently Obama adheres to the Kennedy line of thinking, inherited by political sectors that today have great influence in his administration. These sectors have been given a new lease on life by the failure of the neoliberal policies worldwide.

What prevents Obama from acting firmly against the Honduran oligarchy? He could express his consistency with a speech that would be well received by his people, win him prestige in Latin America and boost his international credibility. At least two reasons prevent him from doing that: the internal contradictions of the system and the deterioration of U.S. hegemony worldwide.

In terms of the contradiction regarding the role of Latin American oligarchies, much has been said about U.S. policy toward Latin America in the past 50 years. Against the reformist vision rise the domestic interests linked to the old forms of domination, the strategic allies of the traditional oligarchies. In effect, those oligarchies control political power in their respective countries and have been historically linked to the U.S. intelligence services and armed forces.

The oligarchies do not constitute a polished sector. They control almost 50 percent of the electorate – at least those who vote – have very important networks of social participation, particularly through fundamentalist religious groups, and have organic links with some of the nation’s most important economic sectors, especially the manufacturers of weapons and the energy sector. It can be said that they steered the United States for almost 30 years, because Clinton had to act in accordance to their agenda. Therefore, their influence in the government’s bureaucratic structure and the security organizations is occasionally decisive.

As demonstrated by their opposition to the reforms of the health system proposed by Obama, the neoconservatives are still able to paralyze the government’s actions in many regards, and they have done that in the case of Honduras by blocking the appointment of Chilean-born Arturo Valenzuela as Under Secretary of State. According to ultraconservative Republican senator Jim DeMint, the reason is that “the United States must give all its support to the people of any country who are struggling for the same values we share and defend in the United States.”

On the other hand, when we speak of positions related to the so-called “U.S. national security,” we are talking not only of a doctrine based on military asymmetry (due to the erosion of U.S. hegemony in other fields) but also of economic interests linked to the production of armaments that require permanent tensions to justify the government’s huge investments in that field.

For the same reason that the Palmerola base in Honduras and the installation of new bases in Colombia are heatedly defended, Obama, despite his promises, cannot withdraw U.S. troops from Iraq and, contrary to the logic of his policy and his supporters, he turns into a hawk when he intensifies the war in Afghanistan.

These factors have a decisive influence on U.S. policy toward Latin America, no matter who the president may be, all the more so when the political processes that occur in a region show a tendency toward the weakening of U.S. hegemony in the area.

Besides, this deterioration is also expressed in the control by the U.S. government over the oligarchies in the region, many of which find their autonomy in their links to drug trafficking and the exercise of power through extra-legal mechanisms, either using the police force or paramilitary groups. The latter act because they fear they will be the scapegoats in any alteration of the order that exists in their countries. In summary, what we call “reforms,” wherever they come from, are no “reforms” to these groups, because they cost their lives.

This explains the apparently disproportionate reaction to a president who in a few months was going to disappear from the public stage as a result of the elections. The problem has not been Zelaya but the credibility of the system vis-à-vis the articulation of a popular movement that, irreproachably utilizing the mechanisms of representative democracy, was gaining force and threatened to clear the obstacles of social control in Honduras, just as it has happened in other countries in the region.

The simple referendum on whether it was timely to call for a plebiscite to reform the Constitution provoked the coup d’état because that was precisely what had to be prevented at all costs. Long-range, it will be decisive in the evaluation regarding the manner in which the conflict will be solved.

If the Obama administration manages to control the American and Honduran troglodytes who provoked the coup, it will surely look for a solution that allows the system to save face through the legitimization of the November elections, even though that may imply the temporary repositioning of Zelaya.

But the crux of the matter is not there. It is whether the elections include (or not) the famous “fourth ballot box” to decided the Constitutional referendum. Until now, this has been one of Zelaya’s demands, because it contains the value of the popular reforms he has proposed and his own credibility as the nation’s leader.

Therefore, what is being debated is how far the expansion of democracy in Latin America can go and to what degree the oligarchy and the U.S. system can resist the consummation of a process of democratic aperture that was conceived in another context, at a time when the United States considered itself so strong that it could control it.

Unfortunately, the case of Honduras shows us that some very powerful characters in that country and the United States grew tired of a game that was becoming dangerous and resorted to the military coup (as usual) because they couldn’t stop the game otherwise. Maybe they’re right, although it remains to be seen if they can do it by force or if they are condemned to failure, because times have changed.

The truth is that the putschists are not so sophisticated and think that, once the mess has been cleared, the politicians will have to take charge of the system. Lamentably, that’s what we have seen Obama doing until now, acting within the limitations imposed by his reality. If he overcomes those limits and advances toward the “new beginning” he promised for Latin America and elsewhere, he will earn credit toward the Nobel Peace Prize he was awarded for his potential.

Jesus Arboleya Cervera is a writer and history professor.