Marco Rubio: Second generation of Cuban-American politicians

By Jesús Arboleya Cervera

A few days ago, Marco Rubio was sworn in as U.S. senator, becoming the first U.S.-born son of Cuban immigrants to attain that position. His rise warns us that we are witnessing a new generational cycle in the participation of Cuban-Americans in U.S. political life.

In relative terms, Cuban-Americans are the ethnic minority that is politically best represented in the country. The control exerted by its politicians on the government structures of South Florida, the high level of representation achieved at both state and national levels, and its links with important sectors of American power, including the sectors that conduct foreign policy, so demonstrate.

All indications are that this trend will continue as the second generation gains access to public office, so the big question is whether this access will determine a change in the ultra-conservative attitudes that have characterized this group so far.

Some consider that Cuban-American politicians will tend to be more liberal, since the subject of Cuba, which has set the political agenda of their parents, presumably will lose importance as a result of their assimilation into American society. However, this has not happened for several reasons.

First, I think we depart from a false interpretation of the assimilation process of immigrants in the United States, which assumes that the second generation tends to lose the cultural particularities that define its ethnicity, making way for a supposed homogeneity that does not exist in American society.

Contrary to this view, according to the most advanced studies in the field, what usually happens is that in the second generation the cultural ingredients that define ethnic identity tend to consolidate, creating new social categories that adapt to the social whole of American life while preserving their individuality. Herein lies the multiethnic nature of American society and it explains the growing interest of immigrant minorities in their respective countries in a context fueled by globalization like never before.

The children of Cuban immigrants are no strangers to this process, especially when, perhaps like no other group, their upbringing has been determined by the conflict between the U.S. and Cuba. This presupposes an ingredient of their political culture, though their view of history and the Cuban reality is more influenced by the imagery conveyed by his parents than by their own experience.

Unlike the rest of Hispanics, thanks precisely to the preferential treatment they’ve received, these young people are situated mainly in the socioeconomic environment of the American white middle class. They respond ideologically both to the classist traditions inherited from their parents, and to the influence of a neoconservative movement that is particularly effective in this segment of the population.

Added to this is the fact that, in the specific case of the Cuban-American politicians, there are objective factors that link their careers to the problem of policy toward Cuba, since their access to the centers of power and to the benefits of the special treatment provided by the U.S. government has depended on it.

Because of the length of their presence in the United States, the descendants of Cuban immigrants who currently enter politics are the children of the “historic exile.” They are organically linked to powerful groups that historically have imposed their vision and interests to the rest of the community and control it unrestrictedly.

If we take Marco Rubio as an example, we see that his discourse is situated to the right of the right. He won the election perched on the agenda of the Tea Party, with support from the Bush clan and the approval of figures like Karl Rove, George Will and Rush Limbaugh, exponents of the most fundamentalist stream of American conservatism.

However, being in the most xenophobic and racist wing of American political thought does not make him a foreign body in the structure of the Cuban-American extreme right. On the contrary, he heeds its tradition and functions accordingly.

Upon reviewing his record, we find that his career has followed the self-reproducing logic of this group. He was part of Ileana Ros-Lehtinen’s team, became mayor and state legislator with the support of this machinery and his political godfather has been Alberto R. Cárdenas, a Cuban-American lobbyist with ties to the most conservative wing of the Republican Party since the Reagan administration. Cárdenas eventually became the only Hispanic to serve as GOP chairman in Florida.

Without the support of these people, who surface every time you scratch the peculiar political life of Miami, the career of Marco Rubio, who is presented to us as the son of a humble couple of long-suffering exiles, would not have crossed the doors of a casino in Las Vegas, where he spent his childhood.

Although Marco Rubio received only 55 percent of the Hispanic vote in Florida (and this gives us a glimpse into the contradictions accumulated in the Latin world in that area, including the Cuban-American community), the factors of change are not sufficient to predict significant changes in the political balance of this region in the short term.

The ultraright, with Cuban-American politicians in the forefront, remains installed as a hegemonic force and, as demonstrated by the recent election, Obama’s victory has not resulted in strengthening the forces that might confront it, because of, among other things, the myopia and lack of consistency of the liberals.

As Marco Rubio himself has confessed, his favorite movie is The Godfather and perhaps he feels like Michael Corleone after becoming senator. Of course, life will not allow the film by Francis Ford Coppola to end.