Cuban Research Institute releases latest Cuba poll

Much is made of the transitions occurring on the island and their impact on Cubans here and there. The present survey highlights an equally important transition taking place in the Miami area, a demographic, generational, and ideological shift that can potentially have a great impact on Cubans on the island, as well as Cubans in the diaspora.

How to deal with Cuba, 55 years after the revolution, is a contested issue. Older respondents and those leaving Cuba before 1980 as an aggregate are still committed to the isolation of Cuba from U.S. citizens and businesses. Even though the policies put in place in the 1960s to promote regime change have not had the desired effect, lifting the embargo, for example, is often viewed as a capitulation to the Cuban government. The more recent arrivals, particularly those coming since 1995, are much more likely to view the policy status quo as negotiable.

Mass migration of Cubans to Florida and the United States is likely to persist in the coming decades. The changes in the population of Cuban origin in South Florida will also continue on many levels. As our surveys show, one of the dimensions of change will be attitudes associated with U.S./ Cuba policy. As more new arrivals become integrated into the democratic processes of their adopted country, voices for changing the current policy will inevitably become louder. Existing policies have contributed to the transformation of South Florida while contributing much less directly to the transformation of the Cuban state. While it’s difficult to predict what kind of policy

changes will occur as the Cuban-American population continues its transition from one composed mostly of exiles to one composed predominantly of immigrants, the current poll does have far-ranging policy implications:

1 – A large majority of the Cubans who recently migrated to the United States would welcome changes to U.S./Cuba policy. Fifty-eight percent of the post-1995 cohort favors lifting the embargo and this proportion is likely to grow as immigration from the island continues at its current pace. More Cubans migrated to the United States during the first ten years of the 21st century than in any previous decade since the revolution. The current split among registered voters on the question of e embargo will become less even as these new arrivals become integrated into the U.S. political system.

2 – Cuban Americans express strong support for policies that increase contact between U.S. citizens, including Cuban Americans, and the Cuban people. Lifting the restrictions on travel currently in place for non-Cuban-American citizens receives strong backing not only among new arrivals and registered voters (80% and 58%), but also among all age cohorts except the 65 and older group. Similar support is expressed for the continuation of “people-to-people” travel options.

3 – Cuban Americans express strong support for measures that increase commercial relations between U.S. businesses and Cubans on specific ventures. As in previous polls, support for companies selling medicine and food spans all cohorts. Similarly, more than 70% of the respondents would like to see the existing limited business relations between U.S. agricultural providers and the island either expanded or maintained.

4 – Cuban Americans express strong support for maintaining Cuba on the State Department’s list of State Sponsors of Terrorism. Although the support for policies encouraging contact among Americans, Cuban Americans, and Cubans on the island is strong, a large majority of the respondents want to keep the sanctions on the Cuban government imposed by the State Department list. A distinction is frequently made between the people of Cuba and the United States and the governments of Cuba and the United States. Increasing contact between people and maintaining the sanctions provided by the State Department list have one thing in common: both exert pressures for change on the government, at different levels of abstraction from the lives of ordinary people. Increasing direct contact between people has an impact on Cubans on both sides of the Florida Straits. Maintaining Cuba on the State Department list does not have that direct a link to the daily lives of the people but sends a strong message to the Cuban state.

5 – Current U.S. immigration policies directed at Cubans receive strong support from Cuban Americans. The unique immigration status of Cubans arriving in the United States receives strong backing from all cohorts, particularly the newer arrivals. The policies associated with the Cuban Adjustment Act and its “wet foot/dry foot” revision have been a focus of debate from both the right and the left in recent years. Clearly these policies have the broad support of those benefiting from them.

6 – Cuban Americans are very likely to vote for candidates who recommend a lifting of the embargo in exchange for other policies that continue to exert pressure on the Cuban government for change. Alternatives to the embargo that increase support for small business owners and human rights pressures receive strong support (58% and 81% respectively). This attitude highlights the view of many respondents of the embargo as a strategic pressure point that could be replaced if other, more timely and appropriate, methods of pressure could be designed.

[FIU’s Cuba poll was conducted by Professors Guillermo Grenier and Hugh Gladwin. Grenier is Professor of Sociology and Graduate Program Director in the Department of Global and Sociocultural Studies at Florida International University. Hugh Gladwin is the past Director of the Institute for Public Opinion Research and Associate Professor in the Department of Global and Sociocultural Studies at Florida International University.]

*****

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

• A slight majority of the Cuban-American community in Miami-Dade County opposes continuing the U.S. embargo of Cuba. Countywide, 52% of the respondents oppose continuing the embargo. This percentage rises among Cuban Americans ages 18-29, 62% of whom oppose continuing the embargo. Similarly, 58% of those arriving since 1995 oppose continuing the embargo. Among registered voters, the split is nearly equal, with 51% in favor of continuing the embargo and 49% opposing its continuation. Support for continuing the embargo is strongest among Republican registered voters.
• A large majority favors diplomatic relations with Cuba (68%), with younger respondents strongly backing the policy shift (90%). Support for re-establishing diplomatic ties maintains a solid majority among all age groups up to age 70, after which it drops to a third of the population supporting the policy. Those arriving since 1995 favor the policy shift by 80%. A majority of registered voters express support—55%. This number balloons to 83% among non-registered voters.
• A large majority of respondents (69%) favor the lifting of travel restrictions impeding all Americans from traveling to Cuba. Younger respondents overwhelmingly endorse this policy shift (89%), as do the most recent arrivals (80%). Approximately 58% of registered voters also favor unrestricted travel by all Americans.
• Similarly, 71% of the respondents support the continuation of “people-to-people” travel opportunities currently endorsed by U.S. policy, with the two earliest cohorts falling short of majority support for the policy (49% and 40% respectively). Sixty percent of registered voters favor the policy as well.
• Cuba is one of only four countries designated as a “State Sponsor of Terrorism”—a list that includes Iran, Sudan, and Syria. This designation restricts a broad range of trade and financial engagements as well as penalizes people and countries engaging in certain trade with Cuba. Sixty-three percent of Cuban Americans believe that Cuba should remain on the list. All cohorts of arrival favor this policy, although the most recent arrivals—since 1995—express the least support—56%. A large majority of 18–29-year-old respondents—65%—would like to see Cuba removed from the list. However, an even larger majority of registered voters (70%) would like to keep Cuba on the list.
• A large majority of respondents favor the “wet foot/dry foot” immigration policy (63%), although those coming after 1980 and younger respondents support it considerably more than those coming before 1980 (figure 8). Fifty-six percent of registered voters favor the policy.
• The Cuban Adjustment Act receives strong backing from the respondents. Eighty-six percent strongly or mostly support the policy that has been applied to Cuban arrivals on U.S. soil since 1966. Ninety-two percent of recent arrivals favor the policy while 64% of 1959–1964 arrivals agree with the policy. Eighty percent of registered voters support the policy.
• Registered voters were asked how likely they would be to vote for a candidate for political office who supported the reestablishment of diplomatic relations. Fifty-three percent responded they would be very likely or somewhat likely to do so. Younger voters expressed stronger support—75% in the 18–29 cohort.
• Registered voters were also asked about the likelihood of voting for a candidate who supports replacing the embargo with a policy that increases support for independent business owners in Cuba. Fifty-seven percent of the voters said they were likely to do so (very/somewhat). Seventy-one percent of new arrivals, compared to 40% of the earliest post-revolution arrivals, said they were likely to do so. Almost twice as many younger voters (18–29) were likely to vote for such a candidate as older voters (65+)—73% to 37%.
• The final question on embargo options asked registered voters how likely they would be to vote for a candidate who supports replacing the embargo with a policy that increases pressure on the Cuban government over human rights. Eighty-one percent of voters said they were very or somewhat likely to do so. A large majority of all age groups expressed this view.

For a complete overview of the poll, click @ http://cri.fiu.edu/events/2014/2014-fiu-cuba-poll/