A renewed great power entanglement in Cuba
The role of Russia has become critical for the economic stability of the island; the US embargo on Cuba has taken its toll on the Cuban economy.
By Vivek Mishra and Rajoli Siddarth Jayaprakash / Observer Research Foundation
The United States’ (US) relations with most Central and South American countries are, at best, complicated. Despite geographical proximity, these nations have remained distanced by ideological differences, political divides driven by issues such as immigration, drugs, and gun control, as well as structural disparities in their economies and governance. Cuba has always been at the heart of this divide. The Bay of Pigs Invasion in April 1961 and the Cuban Missile Crisis of October 1962, underscored by the socialist-capitalist divide, have left bilateral relations between Cuba and the US strained and unresolved. The lingering tensions occasionally flare up, threatening to escalate.
The two ongoing wars—between Russia and Ukraine, and Israel and Hamas—have deepened fissures in the international order. The Western Axis against Russia and China is increasingly countered by growing convergences between the latter two, signalling a widening geopolitical divide. This emerging competitive geopolitics between the two axes is manifesting across various regions, including Africa and Latin America.
The two ongoing wars—between Russia and Ukraine, and Israel and Hamas—have deepened fissures in the international order.
In a move reminiscent of the Cold War, last month a group of ships from the Russian Baltic Fleet docked in the port of Havana for three days. The fleet included a training ship, Smolny; a patrol ship, Neustrashimy; and a tanker, Yelnya. This is the second instance of Russian ships docking in Cuba in recent times. Last month, the Russian Northern fleet’s strike group consisting of the nuclear submarine Kazan, frigate Admiral Gorshkov, the supply tanker Akademik Pashin, and a rescue tugboat docked in Havana after it completed exercises on the use of high-precision weapons in the high seas. With Russia facing increasing Global isolation due to sanctions imposed against them, Moscow’s relations with Havana, over the years, have gained prominence. Bilateral trade has surged to US$450 million in 2022. The increasing Russia-US contestation, existing US-Cuba tension and an emerging Havana-Beijing axis have set grounds for improving new geopolitics in the Americas.
Evolving Russia-Cuba relations
The foundations of the Russia-Cuba relations were set in the Cold War, with the erstwhile Soviet Union being the main economic provider for the socialist Republic, as it provided Havana with comprehensive political and economic support. Cuba, for the USSR, was critical for its geographical proximity with the US; at the height of the Cold War, a US U-2 spy plane found nuclear missiles in Cuba, which led to a 13-day nuclear standoff in October 1961. After the Cold War, Russia-Cuba interaction remained minimal. Russia gained prominence again in 2014, with President Putin visiting the Caribbean island. Both nations have been vocal about each other’s interests in the international platforms, with Russia voting for resolutions condemning the US embargo on Cuba and Havana supporting Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. Both nations have similar objectives for the configuration of the international system and believe in a polycentric world order.
The role of Russia has become critical for the economic stability of the island; the US embargo on Cuba has taken its toll on the Cuban economy, with high inflation and more than 88 percent of Cubans living in poverty. Russian economic aid to Cuba has increased over the years. Cuba received loans from Russia to purchase oil, and the Russian government allocated 800 million rubles for urgent aid to Cuba.
The role of Russia has become critical for the economic stability of the island; the US embargo on Cuba has taken its toll on the Cuban economy, with high inflation and more than 88 percent of Cubans living in poverty.
Russia’s foreign policy concept of 2023 calls for strengthening friendship and increasing mutual trade and investment with Cuba, with emphasis on expanding scientific, cultural, educational, tourism, sports, and other humanitarian ties with Cuba and like-minded Caribbean and Latin American states. Russia’s increasing ship docking coincidentally days before the Venezuelan elections may have been a signal of an emerging anti-US coalition in the Caribbean and Latin America.
What do the recent port calls mean?
The Russian naval exercises have been focused on enhancing Russia’s ability to deploy warships from one theatre to another; it is signalling that the war in Ukraine does not inhibit Russia’s ability to pursue its geopolitical ambitions beyond the Eurasian theatre. According to Katarzyna Zysk, a professor at the Norwegian Institute for Defence Studies, there was an element of practicality in the deployment of ships from Russia’s northern fleet as the Northern fleet is thestrongest fleet of the Russian navy. Further, Russia is probing the US by increasing its military engagements with Cuba.
Although the presence of a few Russian warships does not pose any threat to the US, Washington reiterated that port calls between Russia and Cuba were not a new development, as it was a yearly exercise from 2013 to 2020. However, the presence of Russian warships or increasing Russian influence in the Caribbean island, 90 miles off the Coast of the US, is irksome for Washington. Cuba emphasised that none of the ships were carrying nuclear weapons.
Although the presence of a few Russian warships does not pose any threat to the US, Washington reiterated that port calls between Russia and Cuba were not a new development, as it was a yearly exercise from 2013 to 2020.
Moscow’s outreach to the Caribbean and Latin America is proportional to the increasing Western support for Ukraine. For instance, the first port call to Cuba in June was weeks after NATO countries allowed Ukraine to strike inside Russian territory, which led to Ukraine striking two early-warning radar stations deep inside Russia, which had little-to-no relevance for the conflict in Ukraine rather it was set in place to detect a nuclear attack from the US. Weeks later, a Russian nuclear submarine docked in Cuba; some strategic commentators made far-fetched claims, such as the incident invoking memories of the Cuban Missile Crisis.
Emerging geopolitics
Russia’s re-pivoting to Central America should not be seen in isolation but alongside the trends from China’s strategic embrace of South and Central American countries. China’s new engagements with Latin American countries are poised to transform the continent’s great power relations. China’s Free Trade Agreement with Mexico has found loopholes in the North Atlantic Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) to find alternative ways into the US market and the Chancay Port in Peru along with an existing robust network in the region is poised to change the balance of trade in China’s favour for a long time to come. Besides, China is rapidly expanding its strategic capabilities in the region. In Cuba, the presence of several listening posts and eavesdropping facilities indicates the China imprint. In an all too familiar play, Cuba is negotiating a closer defence and intelligence partnership with China including eavesdropping posts. China’s intention is to get closer to the coasts of the US and collect information through intelligence facilities and telecommunication networks.
Through trade links, ports, and defence pacts, China is inching closer to the US coast. The strengthening Russia-China axis due to the current fissures in the global order and the ongoing conflicts provides the perfect storm for a renewed great power entanglement in the vast geography including the Caribbean and Latin America. Not surprisingly, Cuba has found a mention in US annual threat assessment documents. The Annual Threat Assessment of the US Intelligence Community brought out in February this year flags Cuba as being in direct pursuit of Beijing for building military facilities. As such, from the efforts that were made under the Obama administration to normalise relations with Havana, Cuba is fast receding to a proxy space for a great power struggle.
While it may be too early to draw definitive conclusions from recent port calls and military drills by a small Caribbean country, the proximity of Cuba to the US, coupled with Russia’s growing influence there and a newly concluded security treaty with North Korea in June this year, raises concerns. For now, it seems likely that relations between Russia and Cuba will continue to strengthen. Depending on which way the Ukraine war goes, Cuba’s great power equations could rapidly shift.
Vivek Mishra is a Fellow at the Observer Research Foundation.
Rajoli Siddharth Jayaprakash is a Research Assistant with the Strategic Studies Programme at the Observer Research Foundation.